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COMMENT
LIMITED BUT NOT LOST: A COMMENT ON
THE ECJ'S GOLDEN SHARE DECISIONS
Christine O'Grady Putek*
INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario:' Remo is a large industrialized
nation with a widget manufacturer, Well-Known Co. ("WK") which
has a strong international reputation, and is uniquely identified with
Remo. WK is an important provider of jobs in southern Remo.
Because of WK's importance to Remo, for both economic and
national pride reasons, Remo has a special law (the "WK law"), which
gives the government of southern Remo a degree of control over WK,
all in the name of protection of the company from unwanted foreign
takeovers and of other national interests, such as employment. The
law caps the number of voting shares that any one investor may own,
and gives the government of Southern Remo influence over key
company decisions by allowing it to appoint half the board of
directors.
Now imagine that Remo is a member of the European Union (the
"EU"), and the EU forbids members from implementing such
restrictive measures. Remo has impeded the accomplishment of an
internal market by keeping this law, and violated fundamental
principles of the European Community in so doing. Remo is being
taken to court over this WK law. How should the Community court
balance the interests of Remo and the Community? Remo has a clear
interest in promoting and protecting its industry, but the Community
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to dedicate
this Comment to the memory of my father, John L. O'Grady, who taught me to live
life well. I would like to thank my family and friends, especially my husband Michael,
my parents Leeda and Ralph, and my brother Michael, for all of their love and
support. I would also like to thank Harvey Sperry for his encouragement and advice
over the years. I am grateful to Professor Roger Goebel for leading me to the topic of
golden shares.
1. This hypothetical is based on the German Volkswagen law, and the current
controversy between the European Commission and Germany regarding the
compatibility of that law with Community law. See infra Part III.A. See infra notes 4850 for an introduction to the European Court and its role in the EU.
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has a conflicting interest-promoting an internal market with minimal

interference.
Since 2000, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the
"ECJ" or the "Court") has decided six pivotal cases 2 in which the free
movement of capital and the freedom of establishment 3 were directly
or indirectly restricted through the state holding of "golden shares," a
term used to cover a number of special rights retained by a
government with regards to a formerly state-owned enterprise.4 The
use of golden shares is widespread throughout the EU as well as in

Central and Eastern European nations, many of which eventually
hope to join the EU. These six golden share cases, which will
probably be followed by many more, demonstrate the commitment of
the European Commission (the "Commission") to challenging any
national law which might conflict with the provisions of the Treaty

Establishing the European Community (the "EC Treaty" or "the
Treaty"). Moreover, the manner in which the Court has addressed
the issue provides important guidelines to those nations who still hold
golden shares, or those who plan to reserve such special rights as they

go through the privatization process.
Part I of this Comment introduces the concept of golden shares, and
2. Case C-462/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18
(2003); Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641, [20031 2
C.M.L.R. 19 (2003); Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
[20021 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002); Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. I4781, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49 (2002); Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002
E.C.R. 1-4809, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50 (2002); Case C-58/99, Commission v. Italy, 2000
E.C.R. 1-3811 [hereinafter, collectively, the "golden share" cases].
3. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 43, O.J. (C
340) 173 (1997) (Amsterdam Consolidated Version) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. For
purposes of EU law, the right of establishment is defined by EC Treaty article 43,
which reads:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of
another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply
to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by
nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member
State.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings,
in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph
of Article 48, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law
of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions
of the Chapter relating to capital.
EC Treaty art. 43. Article 43 essentially allows a company or citizen from one
Member State to go into business in any other Member State. It removes obstacles
for a company to set up branches, agencies or subsidiaries in any Member State, or to
establish its principal place of business in any Member State. The second clause of
Article 43 affords this right to self-employed persons as well. Id.
4. A golden share refers to a single share retained by the government to which
special rights attach, such as the right to veto or pre-approve certain company
decisions. The term golden share is used to refer to rights retained by the government
even in the absence of an actual share being held.

2004]

THE ECJ'S GOLDEN SHARE DECISIONS

2221

discusses the relevant background of the free movement of capital and
freedom of establishment, which are the Treaty rights primarily
affected by the use of golden shares. Part I.A. presents the purpose
and background of golden shares, as well as the nature of the golden
share rights to which the Commission objects. Part I.B. provides a
synopsis of relevant EU Treaty Law. Part I.C. introduces some
important ECJ decisions which define the scope of the Treaty rights
affected, and Part I.D. describes the Commission's 1997
Communication, which provides the backdrop against which these
cases were brought. Part II of this Comment analyzes each of the six
golden share cases in turn, beginning with the case against Italy in
2000 and ending with the decisions of May 2003. Finally, Part III
considers the implications of these decisions for the EU and for those
states hoping to gain entry into the Union, and concludes that
carefully crafted golden shares are still a viable means of retaining
governmental control over industries that are imperative to the
national interest. Moreover, these decisions have played a key role in
accomplishing the internal market.
I. GOLDEN SHARES AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS

Golden share devices only became necessary with the relatively
recent introduction of privatization.
Many nations privatized
important industries, but, reluctant to give up all control,
implemented restrictive measures which allow varying degrees of
governmental control over the privatized company.5 The EC Treaty
forbids the use of restrictive measures to hinder the free movement of
capital or the freedom of establishment, with limited exception.6 As
case law has developed regarding these two rights, the Court has
defined the scope of the exceptions, and inferred others by looking to
the case law of other Treaty rights.7
A. Privatizationand Golden Shares
A nation may opt to privatize an enterprise for a variety of reasons:
political accountability, efficiency, a desire to attract capital and/or a
policy supporting a move towards a market economy, among others.8
In the late 1980s a movement towards privatization swept through
Western Europe, affecting many industries.9 The governmental role
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part I.B.3.-4.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See generally Cosmo Graham & Tony Prosser, Privatizing Public Enterprises:
Constitutions, the State, and Regulation in Comparative Perspective 21-24 (1991)
(discussing the economic and political motivation for the British privatization scheme
under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher).
9. See generally Alice Pezard, The Golden Share of Privatized Companies, 21
Brook. J. Int'l L. 85 (1995); Graham & Prosser, supra note 8, at 72 (illustrating the
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in the process was to "protect[] national interests and preserv[e]
national independence."'" In an effort to do so, governments often
retained some power
and influence with regard to the newly
11
privatized company.
One common protective tool is the golden share. 12 Golden shares
were first used in the United Kingdom13 during privatization in the
1980s14 for companies in which the government wanted to maintain
some influence, such as Britoil. 5 A golden share, or "action
sp~cifique," as it is known in France,1 6 vests special rights in the
government vis-A-vis the privatized company. 7 These control rights
can take many forms, and are often granted through the conversion of
a regular share into a "special share" to which these special control
increase in number of privatizations through receipts from privatization in Great
Britain). For example, the petroleum industry was often privatized. In the U.K.,
Britoil was privatized in the early 1980s. See id. at 82. Soci6td Nationale ElfAcquitaine in France was privatized in 1994, with the French government retaining a
golden share. See Roger Benedict, France's Privatization of Elf Aquitaine Rated
Rousing Success (Socit Nationale Elf Aquitaine S.A.), Oil Daily, Feb. 23, 1994,
available at 1994 WL 12778955. That golden share was the subject of one of the six
golden share cases discussed in this note. See infra Part II.B.2. for discussion of the
golden share case against France.
10. Pezard, supra note 9, at 85.
11. See, e.g., id. passim.
12. Paulo CAmara, The End of the "Golden" Age of Privatisations?-TheRecent
ECJ Decisions on Golden Shares, 2002 Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 503, 504. Another such
tool employed to achieve ongoing control in France is the "hard core." Hard cores
are specific pre-selected investors "to whom a proportion of the capital on
privatisation is allocated by the government, restrictions being imposed on disposal
for a period of five years." Cosmo Graham & Tony Prosser, Golden Shares:
Industrial Policy by Stealth, 1988 Public Law 413, 421 (discussing the matters most
commonly involved in the golden share). Hard cores were used in France. Unlike the
U.K., France lacked large institutional investors, and privatization solely via disposing
of shares through the financial markets would have resulted in massive disbursement
of shares, with no one investor owning a large percentage of shares. Fear that such
disbursement would leave the companies at "the mercy of raiders" led the
government to the adoption of hard cores, allowing state influence over the enterprise
after privatization. Id. at 422. Hard cores were used far more frequently than golden
shares, and were heavily criticized. Id. Though it is likely that the Commission would
object to the hard core as a restriction on the free movement of capital, it is also likely
that the argument against them would be more difficult, because the shares are no
longer in the hands of the government. Nonetheless, strong public opposition to the
hard core within France led to Ministerial response and, at least superficially, some
concessions on their use. Id. at 423.
13. See Vincent Kronenberger, The Rise of the 'Golden' Age of Free Movement of
Capital. A Comment on the Golden Shares Judgments of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 4 Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 115, 122 (2003) (citation omitted);
Pezard, supra note 9, at 85. For a comprehensive comparison of the British and
French use of golden shares, see Graham & Prosser, supra note 8, at 141-43 & 151-54;
Graham & Prosser, supra note 12, passim.
14. See Graham & Prosser, supra note 8, at 20.
15. See Graham & Prosser, supra note 12, at 415.
16. See Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 122-23; CAmara, supra note 12, at 503.
17. See, e.g., CAmara, supra note 12, at 503; see also Pezard, supra note 9, at 88-93
(discussing the scope of rights reserved to the state in France, specifically).
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rights attach.18 Alternatively, ministerial veto power can substitute for
an actual share, or can be a supplemental power along with the special

share.19 The most common control rights, and those which have come
under attack by the Commission, are: (1) the right to restrict the
acquisition of shares; (2) the right to appoint directors to the board;
(3) the right to veto certain critical company decisions; and (4) the
right to limit the number of foreign directors on the board of the
company. 20 In France, golden shares are held for a limited duration-

five years at most. 1 But in the United Kingdom there is no maximum
time limit for the controls to remain in place.22
One purpose of the golden share is to give the newly privatized
company protection against hostile takeovers. 3 As former Secretary

of State for Energy for the U.K. Nigel Lawson said, "[t]he very
existence of these powers will act as the most formidable deterrent to
anyone who tries to take over control of the board, of the company or
of the majority of its shares, and who the government considers to be

unacceptable. "24
Some commentators, however, argue that the usual role of golden
shares is not a threat to free markets, but is simply a mechanism by
which the government can protect national interests. In some cases,
Member States that find golden shares desirable as a national policy
(for purposes of national pride) also find them useful as a defensive

measure against more powerful state-owned enterprises operating in
the same sector in other Member States.26 State-held golden shares

18. See Graham & Prosser, supra note 12, at 414; Pezard, supra note 9, at 88.
19. See generally C~mara, supra note 12, at 504 (discussing the various types of
golden share rights and the forms in which they have developed); Holger Fleisher,
Case C-367/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Portuguese Republic
(Golden shares); C-483/99 Commission of the European Communities v. French
Republic (Golden shares); and C-503/99, Commission of the European Communities
v. Kingdom of Belgium (Golden shares). Judgments of the Full Court of 4 June 2002,
40 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 493, 494 (2003) (discussing how golden shares can take the
form of varying governmental rights); see also Pezard, supra note 9, at 91-92
(discussing the French right to veto asset disposal, which is embedded in the golden
share).
20. Communication of the Commission on Certain Legal Aspects Concerning
Intra-EU Investment, 1997 O.J. (C 220) 15, 1 7-8 [hereinafter Communication]. See
generally Cimara, supra note 12, at 504 (noting the specific golden share rights
involved in the 2002 golden share cases before the ECJ); Pezard, supra note 9, at 8889 (outlining the various kinds of rights that the French government retains with a
golden share).
21. See Graham & Prosser, supra note 12, at 420-21; Pezard, supra note 9, at 95.
22. See Graham & Prosser, supra note 12, at 414.
23. See generally Pezard, supra note 9, at 85; see also CAmara, supra note 12, at
511 (discussing how, intentional or otherwise, golden shares are a defense against
takeovers).
24. Graham & Prosser, supra note 12, at 428 (citation omitted) (discussing the
golden share created in Britoil).
25. See, e.g., Pezard, supra note 9, at 95 (asserting that this is the role of the golden
share in France).
26. See Richard Orange, Europe Demands End to Restrictive Rules in Italy, Spain,
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are a valuable tool for protecting
specified industries because they
27
make a takeover much less likely.
Regardless of the motive for creating and retaining a golden share,
the Commission decided in the mid-1990s that golden shares can
conflict with Community law28 and infringe upon two fundamental
freedoms:
the free movement of capital and the freedom of
establishment. 29 Obstacles inhibiting investment from other Member
States have generally occurred in two ways:3 ° as exchange controls or
company law,3 ' or through privatization legislation. Furthermore,
such restrictions can be of two distinct types, requiring two forms of
review: discriminatory, applying only to foreign investors, or nondiscriminatory, applying to all investors alike.32 In either case, such
measures are restrictive and both forms can conflict with Community
law.33 It is precisely this conflict which has led the Commission to
argue vehemently against the use of golden shares by Member States.

Int'l Oil Daily, July 10, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File. For example,
Spain claimed a need to maintain a golden share in the energy sector as protection
against a takeover by Electricit6 de France, a state-controlled entity. Id. Even though
France has reluctantly agreed to open the electricity market to competition by 2007,
other Member States continue to insist on protecting their industry from the French
giant. See id. Italy, for example, which retains a golden share in Enel, its electricity
producer, also fears a French takeover of their energy sector. See id.; see also infra
Part III.A.
27. See Graham & Prosser, supra note 8, at 144-45 (discussing the reasons for the
British government to use its golden share in Britoil to thwart a takeover attempt by
British Petroleum ("BP") precisely because a concentration of so much market power
in one domestic company would have an undesirable effect on competition). This is
true for both domestic and foreign takeover initiatives. Id.
28. See Communication, supra note 20. For a more detailed discussion of the
Communication, see infra Part I.D.
29. See Communication, supra note 20. For discussion of how these rights are
infringed, see infra Part II. See also Fleisher, supra note 19, at 495-98; Kronenberger,
supra note 13, at 120-22.
30. See, e.g., Cdmara, supra note 12, at 503-04; see also Kronenberger, supra note
13, at 116. It should be emphasized at the outset that obstacles inhibiting investment
from other Member States are not necessarily created during the process of
privatization through the adoption of measures like the golden share, but when they
are, such obstacles are most often the subject of criticism.
31. See Cfmara, supra note 12, at 503-04. For example, in the golden share case
against the U.K., the U.K. argued that any restriction imposed was a result of
company law, and thus not assailable under Treaty obligations. Case C-98/01,
Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641,
25-26, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 19
(2003),
25-26. Though the U.K.'s argument did not prove successful in this
instance, it was not because company law cannot restrict capital flows, but rather
because in this case, the restriction was not the result of normal company law
operations. See id. 48; see also infra Part II.C.2.
32. See Communication,supra note 20, %1
6.
33. See EC Treaty arts. 43, 56.
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B. Treaty Rules
The creation and continued integration of the European Union is
one of the most interesting and complex developments of the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The goals and aspirations of the
Union, created as the European Economic Community (the "EEC"),
were first declared in the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957.1' Since
that initial agreement3 5 the Community has grown in size and in
scope,36 adding nine members3 7 and adopting a larger, more
comprehensive structure, the EU.38 Even before the founding nations
created the European Community in Rome in 1957, they recognized
the importance of a judicial body, with the mission of ensuring the
consistent interpretation and application of law.3 9 Therefore, in 1952
they created the Court of Justice4" to guarantee that the eventual
European unification would be guided by common legal principles.41
Community obligations frequently come into conflict with the
national law of Member States. 42 The Court established the

34. See EC Treaty pmbl.
35. The original agreement was between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxemburg and the Netherlands. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1957) [hereinafter ECSC Treaty].
36. See generally George A. Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European
Union Law 3-27 (2d ed. 2002) (detailing the inception and development of the
Community from its earliest stage as the European Coal and Steel Community,
through its most recent developments in the Treaty of Nice).
37. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
U.K. joined the Community and are parties to the EC Treaty. See EC Treaty pmbl.
n.1.
38. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 3-27.
39. See generally id. at 58-59; see also Court of Justice of the European
at
for
Europe,
A
Court
Communities,
(last visited Feb. 12,
http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/unejuridiction.htm
2004).
40. See ECSC Treaty tit. 1I, art. 31.
41. See, e.g., L. Neville Brown & Tom Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the
European Communities 1 (5th ed. 2000). The ECJ has several important functions,
one of which is to ensure that Community law is interpreted and applied consistently
throughout the EU. See T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law
52 (4th ed. 1998). Additionally, the Court, as a non-political institution, ensures that
political considerations do not influence the enforcement of the law. Id. For a more
thorough discussion of the role and composition of the Court, see id. at 52-83.
42. In 2002, more than one-third of the cases brought before the ECJ were direct
action suits, which challenge a national measure as infringing upon Treaty rights. See
Court of Justice of the European Communities, Statistics of Judicial Activity of the
Court of Justice (2002), in Annual Report 165 (2002) (showing a breakdown in the
number and types of actions brought before the ECJ from 1998 through 2002), at
http://www.curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index.htm [hereinafter 2002 Annual
Report]. Though some of these actions challenge the failure of the Member State to
initiate the legislation frequently needed to implement EU law, the numbers
demonstrate that conflict between Member State law and EU law is not infrequent.
See, e.g., Case C-299/01, Commission v. Luxemburg, 2002 E.C.R. 1-5899 (holding that
a minimum residence requirement for granting the minimum income determined by
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supremacy of the EU law over national law early on. In 1964, in Costa
v. E.N.E.L.,4 3 the ECJ held that where a direct conflict arises between
44
Community law and national law, Community law takes precedence.
The Court further clarified the relationship between Community law
4 5 holding
and national law in Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,
that:
[N]ational authorities may take action against an agreement in
accordance with their national law, even when an examination of the
agreement from the point of view of its compatibility with
Community law is pending before the Commission, subject however
to the condition that the application of national law may not
prejudice the full and uniform application of Community law .... 46
Thus, where there is no direct (or indirect 47 ) conflict between the
Community and national law, they operate in tandem.48
With the increased integration of the EU in the past ten years,
conflicts have arisen between national law and the proper
interpretation of Community law.49 Treaty Article 226 grants the
Commission the power to sue Member States not only for violations
legislation was an infringement of the right of establishment, and thus a violation of
treaty obligations), availableat http://curia.eu.int/en/content/uris/index.htm.
43. Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585.
44. See id. at 593.
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having.., powers
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the
States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign
rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which
binds both their nationals and themselves.
See id. at 594; see also Graham & Prosser, supra note 8, at 64-65. Treaty primacy was
further developed and established through a number of significant judgments, and it is
now clear that the Treaty will prevail over even national constitutional provisions. See
Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp., ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
1990 E.C.R. 1-2433, $$ 19-23, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 375 (1990), $$ 19-23; Case 106/77
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629, 1$
21-24, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263 (1978), $$ 21-24 [hereinafter Simmenthal II]; see also
Hartley, supra note 41, at 218-20 (discussing the supremacy of Community law despite
the fact that no such rule is explicitly created by the Treaty).
45. Case 14/68, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1, [1969] 36 C.M.L.R.
100 (1969).
46. Id. 9.
47. See infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing how even regulations
which might dissuade someone from exercising a Treaty right are unacceptable).
48. See Robert Walz, Rethinking Walt Wilhelm, or the Supremacy of Community
Competition Law over National Law, 21 Eur. L. Rev. 449, 449-50 (1996). The
intricacies of when Community law preempts Member State national law is beyond
the scope of this Comment. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, 115-18, 269-351 for a
discussion of national law pre-emption and the Doctrine of Supremacy, as well as
some relevant case law.
49. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 42, at 157 (illustrating the increase in
caseload from 1998 to 2002). Compare The Court of Justice of the European
Communities, Statistics of Judicial Activity of the Court of Justice, in Annual Report
3
tbl.1
(1997)
(showing
the
caseload
in
1997),
at
http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index.htm
[hereinafter
1997
Annual
Report].
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of the Treaty, but also for violations of EC legislation or decisions."
The Commission takes this responsibility seriously: In 2002, the

Commission brought ninety-three actions against Member States for
violations of Treaty obligations." In ninety of those cases, the ECJ
held that a violation occurred.5 2 Though most of the violations were

for relatively minor infractions-such as non-implementation of
enabling legislation53 for various EU enactments nationally-at least

some of them were for more serious infringements of Treaty
obligations.54

The ECJ has developed standards for reviewing

violations of these Treaty obligations over the past five decades.5
Some of the most important judgments concern Member State
infringements of the four "fundamental freedoms"56 defined by the
EC Treaty:

persons;"

(1) free movement of goods;57 (2) free movement of

(3) free movement of services59 and the right of

establishment;60 and (4) free movement of capital.61

Early in

Community history, the Court held that the first three of the

fundamental freedoms had direct legal effect.62 Because the initial
Rome Treaty text on free movement of capital was limited by a clause
referring to the necessity for discretionary action, the Court initially
50. For an overview of enforcement actions, see Hartley, supra note 41, at 294323.
51. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 42, at 163.
52. Id.
53. Community law created by directives requires national enablement legislation.
A directive is binding Community law, which can be issued by the Council, the
Parliament in conjunction with the Council (though not by the Parliament acting
alone), or the Commission. Though directives create binding Community law, it is
left to the Member States to enact legislation determining the form and method of
implementation in the individual states. See generally Bermann et al., supra note 36, at
75-76.
54. E.g., Case C-6/02, Commission v. France, 2003 E.C.R. 1-2389 (alleging that
France had not met its obligations under Article 28, which prohibits qualitative
restrictions on imports).
55. See, e.g., Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. I1663; Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di
Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995), 37 (establishing the
four-step inquiry into any national law or regulation which has the potential to
infringe upon a fundamental freedom).
56. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 42, at 161.
57. EC Treaty art. 23 (previously art. 9).
58. EC Treaty art. 39 (previously art 48). Article 39 refers specifically to workers,
but its reach has been expanded through several directives, discussed infra note 81.
59. EC Treaty art. 49 (previously art. 59).
60. EC Treaty art. 43 (previously art. 52). Articles 43 and 49 are frequently read
together as different facets of the same right. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, at
654.
61. EC Treaty art. 56 (previously art. 73(b)).
62. Direct effect means that a Community law generates not only obligations
between the Member States, but also creates rights which private parties may seek to
enforce against national governments. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 252. For
an excellent discourse on both vertical and horizontal direct effect, see Hartley, supra
note 41, at 206-08.
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declined to give this freedom direct effect.63 However, the Treaty of
Maastricht, effective November 1, 1993, introduced a new provision'
regarding the free movement of capital, which mandated total
liberalization of capital movements.65 Protection of the first three
freedoms remains explicit and unequivocal in the EC Treaty.66
1. Free Movement of Goods

Chapter 2 of the EC Treaty specifically forbids any restriction of the
free movement of goods, either directly or through indirect but
equivalent measures.67 Customs duties, or charges which are the
equivalent, are impermissible as between Member States on either
imports or exports, 68 as are quantitative limitations on the movement
of goods, or comparable measures.69 In 1978, the Court announced a
new doctrine in the field of free movement of goods in Rewe-Zentral
AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftir Branntwein ("Cassis de
Dijon") 7' holding that restrictions "necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements relating.., to the effectiveness of fiscal

supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial
transactions and the defence of the consumer,

71 might

be acceptable.7"

63. See Case 203/80, Criminal Proceedings Against Casati, 1981 E.C.R. 2595, TT
11-12, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1981), TT 11-12; see also infra notes 100-07 and
accompanying text.
64. EC Treaty art. 56. Article 56 reads:
1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all
restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and
between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.
2.Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all
restrictions on payments between Member States and between Member
States and third countries shall be prohibited.
Id.
65. See Leo Flynn, Coming of Age: The Free Movement of Capital Case Law
1993-2002, 39 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 773 (2002) ("[T]he free movement of capital...
");see also
was.., elevated into the Treaty as part of the Maastricht amendments ....
Pezard, supra note 9, at 94 (noting that the European Court of Justice has declared
the "free circulation of capital" a fundamental freedom).
66. EC Treaty arts. 23, 39, 43, 49.
67. EC Treaty arts. 23-31. In In re Gingerbreadthe Court reasoned that a charge
which had the effect of a customs duty, imposed unilaterally by the Member State,
should be treated as a customs duty. Joined Cases 3/62, Commission v. Belgium &
2/62, Commission v. Luxemburg (In re Gingerbread), 1962 E.C.R. 425.
68. EC Treaty art. 23.
69. EC Treaty arts. 28, 29.
70. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fOr
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, [19791 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979) [hereinafter Cassis de
Dijon].
71. Id. 8.
72. In Cassis de Dijon, the Court considered a German law which effectively
3. Under German law, such
restricted the importation of French liqueur. Id.
products must have a minimum alcohol content of twenty-five percent and since the
Cassis de Dijon did not, the government forbad its import. Id. T 2. Notably, the
Court implied that if a product was lawfully produced and marketed in one Member
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The Commission embraced the opinion as a pivotal one furthering
free movement of goods.73 Moreover, the decision became important

Court carried the concept that only
in other fields as well, as 7the
"mandatory requirements 4 can justify a restrictive national law
forward into free movement of services,75 and into the field of the
right of establishment. 76 By now, it is well-established that measures
necessitated by the general/public interest can justify restriction of a
fundamental freedom.7 7
2. Free Movement of Persons
Article 39 guarantees the free movement of workers,78 though

certain exceptions exist where justified by reason of public policy,

security or health. 79 Article 17 extended this freedom to other persons
as well by conferring European Citizenship to the nationals of all

Member States.8" Furthermore, three directives adopted in the early

1990s extended the right of residence to retired or disabled persons,
students, and those who otherwise did not have such a right under
other areas of Treaty or Community law. 8
State, there should be a presumption in favor of its ability to be sold in another. See
id.
14 ("There is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been
lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages
should not be introduced into any other Member State ..."). The Court allowed
that some restrictions may be imposed, but only those which were "necessary in order
to satisfy mandatory requirements." Id. T 8. The Court held that, because the
restriction did not fall into one of the Treaty's explicit exceptions, the German law
violated EC Treaty article 28 (then Art. 30). Id. $T 14-15.
73. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 511.
74. Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R.649, 8, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494, 8.
75. Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany (In re Insurance Services), 1986 E.C.R.
3755, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69 (1986). The term "mandatory requirements" has recently
been replaced by the terms "general good" or the "general or national interest," both
of which are frequently referred to by the Court when discussing the acceptability of a
restrictive national measure. See, e.g., Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002
E.C.R. 1-4731, T 47, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), 47; see also Bermann et al., supra
note 36, at 510 ("'Mandatory requirements' is an awkward translation of the French
'exigences imperatives,' which has been better translated in later judgments as
imperative state or public interests.").
76. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995).
77. For a more complete discussion of the development of this exception, see infra
notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
78. EC Treaty art. 39.
79. These exceptions are explicitly enumerated in EC Treaty article 39(3).
80. EC Treaty art. 17.
81. Council Directive 90/365, art. 1, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 28, 28-29 (extending the
right of residence in any Member State to self-employed and retired persons); Council
Directive 90/364, art. 1, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 26 (providing the right of residence to all
persons who were not granted the right by other provisions of law); Council Directive
93/96, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 317) 59, 60 (granting the right of residence to students). The
Council originally issued a directive pertaining to the rights of residence for students
in 1990, along with Directive 90/365 and Directive 90/364, but it was annulled by an
ECJ decision in 1992. See Council Directive 93/96, 1993 O.J. (L 317) 59, 60. Hence
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3. Free Movement of Services and the Right of Establishment
The free movement of services, including both the right to provide
and receive the same,8 2 is protected by Articles 49 and 50, and the
related right of establishment is definitively protected by Article 43:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions
on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in
the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such
prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of
agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State
established in the territory of any Member State.83
Articles 45 and 46 identify acceptable reasons to restrict freedom of
establishment by stipulating specific circumstances within which
national law may restrict the rights created by this freedom. 4 The
most important exception is for measures that a) discriminate against
non-nationals; and b) are justified by reasons pertaining to public
policy, security, or health.
As early as 1974, the Court interpreted the free movement of
services and the freedom of establishment as having vertical direct
the later adoption of Directive 93/96. See also Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 631.
82. Though the freedom to provide services is all that is enunciated in the Treaty,
the right to free movement to receive services is well established in case law. See, e.g.,
Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R.
377, 10, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52 (1984), 10.
83. EC Treaty art. 43.
84. EC Treaty art. 45 (stipulating that activities connected with the exercise of
official authority are exempt from the provisions of the chapter on the right of
establishment); EC Treaty art. 46 (excepting national laws "providing for special
treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health").
85. EC Treaty art. 46. See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text for a
discussion of how the Court has applied the public security exception only insofar as
the national measure in question is compatible with the principle of proportionality.
A less frequently used exception is that for activities which are connected to the
implementation of "official authority." See EC Treaty art. 45. Though the inclusion
of activities connected with "official authority" appears to broaden the possible
applications of the exceptions, in practice, that clause has been interpreted very
narrowly, and only activities with a "direct and specific connexion with the exercise of
official authority" can restrict the right of establishment. Case 2/74, Reyners v.
Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 631, 54, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305 (1974), 54. In Reyners,
the Court was faced with the question of whether the legal profession is excepted
from the right of establishment due to the fact that it is "organically [connected] with
the functioning of the public service of the administration of justice." Id. $ 35.
Holding that since only certain activities of the profession are connected with official
authority, and that those activities are separable, the Court determined that the legal
profession is not excluded from the right of establishment. Id. 1 55. An entire
profession would only be excepted in the unusual case where "such activities were
linked with that profession in such a way that freedom of establishment would result
in imposing on the Member State concerned the obligation to allow the exercise, even
occasionally, by non-nationals of functions appertaining to official authority." Id. 91
46.
The Court applies the official authority exception in rare and narrow
circumstances.
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effect, and as such, vested in individuals the right to challenge national

measures which allegedly infringe upon these rights.8 6
In van
Binsbergen, the Court was asked to provide a preliminary ruling as to
whether Articles 49 and 50 had direct effect. 87 Van Binsbergen

challenged a Dutch law which prevented him from using the services
of a legal representative whose primary place of residence was not in
the Netherlands.8" The Court held Articles 49 and 50 had direct
effect, and that national law may not impede trans-border services

simply because the service provider resides in another member state,

and not locally.8 9 In its analysis, the Court looked to the parallel
conclusion in Reyners9° that the right of establishment has direct
effect.9
Through judgments in several cases,92 the Court has clearly
established that even non-discriminatory restrictive measures will only
be permitted under limited circumstances. In van Binsbergen,9' the
Court considered the effect of the restriction on the right to provide
services, and noted that all requirements that a person providing
service must be a national of the Member State in question, or which
mandated habitual residence in the Member State would "depriv[e]
Article 59 [now Article 49] of all useful effect." 94 The Court
recognized that such requirements may be compatible with Treaty law
when necessary for the "general good."95
86. Vertical direct effect permits a citizen of a Member State to challenge the
Member State's national regulations, laws or measures that infringe upon a freedom
granted by the Treaty or a directive with direct effect. Thus there is a private right of
action, not simply an obligation as between the members of the Community. See
Hartley, supra note 41, at 206-15 (explaining direct and indirect effect); Bermann et
al. supra note 36, at 252. Horizontal direct effect, on the other hand, creates rights of
action between private parties. Id. Thus, where there is horizontal effect, a person
has Treaty rights and obligations vis-A-vis other people, not just against the Member
State.
87. See Case 33/74, van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
18 ("The
Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, $ 18, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (1974),
Court is also asked whether the first paragraph of Article [49, previously Article 59]
and the third paragraph of Article [50, previously Article 60] of the EEC Treaty are
directly applicable and create individual rights which national courts must protect.").
88. See id. $ 4 (noting also that the legal representative was a Dutch national who
moved to Belgium during the proceedings).
89. See id. $$ 15-16 (deciding that in the absence of a requirement of special
qualifications or "professional regulation" a requirement that the provider of services
be a habitual resident of the locale is not acceptable).
90. Case 2/74, Reyners, 1974 E.C.R. 631, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305.
27,
91. See id. $ 32; see also Case 33/74, van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. 1299,
[1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298, 27.
92. Case 33/74, van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298; Case
205/84, Commission v. Germany (In re Insurance Services), 1986 E.C.R. 3755, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 69 (1986); Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995).
93. Case 33/74, van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298.
94. Id. 11.
95. Id. 12.
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The general good or public interest exception was carried forward

over a decade later in another significant Court decision in In re
Insurance Services.96

The Court held that restrictions upon the
freedom to provide services could only be accepted if "in the field of

activity concerned there are imperative reasons relating to the public
interest. 9 7 More recently, the public interest exception was critical to
the Court's reasoning in Gebhard,98 when the Court stated that any

acceptable restriction "must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner [and] must be justified by imperative requirements in the
general interest."99 These three cases illustrate the development of

the rule that non-discriminatory measures, like discriminatory ones,
will only rarely be tolerated.

4. Free Movement of Capital
Finally, with the amendments to the Treaty in Maastricht, effective

on November 1, 1994,' °° free movement of capital is now also
specifically and indisputably protected by Article 56.101 The original
EEC Treaty included a chapter devoted to capital movements, within
which Article 67 obligated Member States to "progressively abolish
between themselves all restrictions on the movement of capital."" °2
The Chapter allowed the Council to adopt directives to further this
goal," 3 and in the 1960s two such directives were adopted."°
However, Article 67 was limited by Article 73, which allowed the

Commission to authorize, and Member

States to implement,

96. Case 205/84, In re Insurance Services, 1986 E.C.R. 3755, [19871 2 C.M.L.R. 69.
In In re Insurance Services, the Court evaluated certain German restrictions placed
upon insurers established in another Member State. In order to provide insurance
services within a second state, German law required that the insurer have a
permanent establishment in the second state, as well as separate authorization from
the appropriate supervisory body of the second state. Id. 28.
97. Id. 29.
98. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995). Gebhard is important to
the analysis of the golden share cases not only for its adoption of the public interest
exception, but also for the formulation of the four-part test which the Court applies to
restrictive national measures. Gebhard is discussed in greater detail infra notes 13539 and accompanying text.
99. Case C-55/94, Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, 37.
100. Treaty on the European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1, 32 (as
amended by the Treaty of Nice).
101. EC Treaty art. 56. For the text of Article 56, see supra note 64.
102. Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 1173 (quoting Article 67(1) (now deleted) of
the EEC Treaty).
103. EC Treaty article 69 (repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam) granted the
Council authorization to issue directives to implement Article 67. See id.
104. See id. at 1173-74 (discussing the initial success regarding free movement of
capital under Article 67, and the subsequent stagnation). The first directive adopted,
Directive 921/60, initially implemented Article 67. Its effect was later expanded by
Directive 63/21. Id. Both directives focused on liberalizing commercial capital flows.
Id. at 1174.
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restrictive measures designed to protect the functioning of the
Member States' capital markets. °5 Such an exception was susceptible
to broad application, which in fact occurred throughout the economic

turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s."°
Moreover, because of this
limitation, in Casati17 the Court declined to interpret Article 67 as one
having direct effect.
In contrast to the original treatment of capital in Article 67 of the
Treaty of Rome, the amended Treaty now states: "[A]ll restrictions
on the movement of capital between Member States... shall be
prohibited."'0 8 Despite the initial appearance of clarity and objectivity
of the exceptions to the freedom, which are detailed in Article 58,
subsequent judicial analysis has demonstrated that some ambiguity
remains as to the extent and nature of these exceptions, particularly
that relating to public security. 9 Notably, the Court has imported
105. See id. at 1173 (detailing the various articles within the chapter on capital
movements in the original EEC Treaty).
106. See id. at 1174 (discussing the frequency of Commission authorization for
restrictive schemes throughout the two decades).
107. Case 203/80, Criminal Proceedings Against Casati, 1981 E.C.R. 2595,
1112, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1981), $ 11-12.
108. EC Treaty art. 56(1). The Treaty still permits a few restrictions, however,
which are expressly set out in Article 58(1). See EC Treaty art. 58. Article 58(1)(a)
provides an exemption for restrictions imposed to distinguish between taxpayers
based on residence. See EC Treaty art. 58(1)(a). Article 58(1)(b) exempts restrictions
imposed to "prevent infringements of national law" specifically, laws relating to
taxation and supervision of financial institutions, as well as those procedures requiring
declaration of capital movements, where the purpose is explicitly administrative or for
gathering statistical information. EC Treaty art. 58(1)(b). Article 58(1)(b) also
includes an exception for public security or public policy. Id. The exceptions detailed
in Article 58 are narrower than those found elsewhere in the Treaty, which
systematically also include public health (clearly of limited relevance to capital
movements). See Flynn, supra note 65, at 796. However, the chapter of the Treaty on
free movement of goods also contains a public morality exception, and the freedom of
establishment and the right to provide services each include an exception for the
exercise of official authority. See EC Treaty arts. 45, 55. Both exceptions could also
have been inserted in Article 58. It is not impossible to imagine a nation regulating
investment in sectors which may be closely connected with morality, such as lotteries
and gambling. Cf Case C-275/92, Her Majesty's Customs & Excise v. Schindler, 1994
E.C.R. 1-1039,
60-61, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 4 (1994),
60-61 (determining that
legislation which allows small scale lotteries, but prohibits larger ones is an acceptable
restriction on the freedom to provide services, because "it is not possible to disregard
the moral, religious or cultural aspects of lotteries, like other types of gambling, in all
the Member States").
109. For example, the Court must still interpret which activities are meant to fall
into the public security realm. There is little doubt that activities surrounding
national security are exempted. See EC Treaty art. 296(1)(b). However, there are
other activities which are also vital to public security, and the Court has begun to
identify these through case law. See Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for
Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R. 2727, 34, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984), 34 (finding
that protecting petroleum supplies is vital to the public security); Case C-503/99,
Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, 46, [20021 2 C.M.L.R. 50 (2002), 46
(holding that protection of energy supplies is analogous to protecting petroleum
supplies).
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from the sector of services and establishment doctrines the notion of
"overriding national interests" as an acceptable reason to restrict
capital movements. 110 However, as illustrated by the golden share
cases, what constitutes an overriding national interest is not well
defined and is open to varying interpretations, thus introducing more
uncertainty and allowing the use of more subjective criteria in

evaluating the justification of a Member State restriction."'
Over time, the Court has developed an impressive body of case law
from which to draw upon when evaluating infringements of EU law
and Treaty obligations. 112 In 2002 alone the Court heard 513 cases.'13

Decisions pertaining to the fundamental freedoms account for a

substantial percentage of the ECJ's recent judgments.114 In 2002, the

Court handed down many decisions relating to the free movement of
capital, 1 5 as well as numerous decisions regarding infringements of

the right of establishment." 6 In order to better comprehend the
Court's reasoning in the golden share cases, a basic understanding of
judicial interpretation of the free movement of capital and the
freedom of establishment is necessary. This Comment now describes
that judicial interpretation.
B. The Coming of Age of Capitaland EstablishmentCase Law
The use of golden shares implicates two fundamental freedoms: the
free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment.
Therefore, principles from both bodies of law are relevant in
analyzing golden share restrictions.
1. Interpretation of Article 43: The Freedom of Establishment
Freedom of establishment, detailed in Article 43, "include[s] the
right to take up and pursue activities as self employed persons and to
110. See, e.g., Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, T 49,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), T[49. The notion of "overriding requirements of the
general interest" (also referred to as requirements of the national interest) was
brought to capital case law from the right of establishment, which had borrowed it
from free movement of goods. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the extension of "overriding national interests" from the case law of the
right to provide services into the related right to establishment. See also Bermann et
al., supra note 36, at 676 (noting that the concept of a national interest exception was
extended to the free movement of services in In re Insurance Services from free
movement of goods, specifically, from Cassis de Dijon).
111, For more detailed discussion of the Court's evaluation of potentially
restrictive measures, see infra Part II.
112. Though the ECJ does not have a doctrine of stare decisis, "the Court does
folow its previous decisions in almost all cases." Hartley, supra note 41, at 75.
113. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 42, at 158.
114. See id,at 161. In 2002, it was nineteen percent. Id.
115. There were twenty-four such judgments in 2002. See id.
116. Eleven judgments pertaining to the freedom of establishment were handed
down in 2002. See id.
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'
set up and manage undertakings" 117
as well as enabling nationals of
any Member State to establish "agencies, branches or subsidiaries"1"8
throughout the Community.
Freedom of establishment covers
investments as well," 9 and thus is closely related to the free movement
12
of capitalY.
Not surprisingly, an infringement of one is often linked
with an infringement of the other. 2 1 Since the Treaty of Maastricht,
the ECJ has applied the laws governing the two freedoms in

parallel.2

The provisions of Article 43 apply to investments which grant
control of a company, but do not apply to those which represent a
passive investment, such as one taken for portfolio diversification.
However, the actual line between a purely passive investment and an
investment with control rights is sometimes difficult to draw, and no
clear answer exists. 123 Advocate General 24 ("A.G.") Alber addressed
117. EC Treaty art. 43.
118. Id.
119. See generally Case C-251198, Baars v. Inspecteur der Belastingen
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G.
Alber, T 33, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 49 (2000), Opinion of A.G. Alber, 33 (discussing the
difficulty in drawing a line between an investment which is a capital flow, and an
investment which falls into the right of establishment).
120. See id.
13. The distinction between the two freedoms is difficult to draw
specifically because they are often intertwined. The acquisition of company shares
obviously requires a capital movement, but can easily also involve establishment,
particularly if the acquisition is great enough to give the purchaser some control rights
vis-A-vis the company. Kronenberger likens the purchase of company shares to the
purchase of real estate, which also, by its very nature, requires a movement of capital
in order to achieve an establishment (in that case, the real estate). Kronenberger,
supra note 13, at 127. Though Kronenberger notes that the wording of the Treaty
chapter on capital movements seems to imply that the two freedoms should not be
applied concurrently, he recognizes that this is by no means clear. Id. Notably, A.G.
Alber argues that the rules of both freedoms can, and in some instances, should, be
applied together. See id. at 129-30; see also supra Part I.B.3.
121. See, e.g., Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et
de l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955, $ 10, 15 (finding infringements of both freedom
of establishment and free movement of capital where a Luxemburg regulation
precluded interest rate subsidies for those who take a loan from an institution which
was not one approved in Luxemburg); see also Flynn, supra note 65, at 788;
Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 127.
122. See Case C-251/98, Baars, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G. Alber, 9 15,
[2000] 1 C.M.L.R. 49, Opinion of A.G. Alber,
15. See infra Part I.C.3. for a
discussion of how and why the Court usually opts to apply the law pertaining to either
the free movement of capital or the freedom of establishment, but not both, when
infringements of both are alleged.
123. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 65, at 788 ("When distinguishing between the
internal market freedoms, the line dividing establishment and capital is the hardest of
all to draw.").
124. The role of the Advocate General ("A.G.") is unparalleled in the U.S. system.
An A.G. is a legal professional having the same rank as an ECJ judge. See EC Treaty
art. 222. The A.G. derives his power directly from the Treaty: "It shall be the duty of
the Advocate-General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make,
in open court, reasoned submissions on cases brought before the Court of Justice, in
order to assist the Court in the performance of the task assigned to it." Id. Though
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this issue in Baars,125 which involved a Dutch decision to deny a tax

exemption to a Dutch national for his investment in an Irish

enterprise, of which he was the sole shareholder. 2 6 Though Dutch law

provided for just such an exemption, when Baars applied the
exemption to his taxes, it was denied. 27 The Dutch government
argued that the specific tax provision in question was intended to
prevent the double taxation of a sole shareholder who would have to

pay both the wealth tax and the company tax. 128 Baars challenged the
denial on two grounds: It infringed upon freedom of establishment
and also on the free movement of capital. 1 9 The Commission and the
Dutch government disagreed as to which rule was truly applicable, 3 '

which is not surprising, as the law implicated both freedoms.
Advocate General Alber ultimately determined that the line

between a capital movement and the right of establishment was "at
the point where a shareholder ceases to confine himself to the mere
provision of capital in support of a particular business activity carried
on by another person, and begins to become involved himself in
conducting the business."''
Of course, where the shareholder is
merely providing capital, his rights are still protected under Article
56.132 Because golden shares often limit the number of shares which
an individual can hold precisely because a large holding may permit-

and in practice often does permit-the investor to have some

influence, the right of establishment is certainly at issue.'33
For this reason, the development of EU law regarding the freedom
of establishment has implications for the golden share cases. The

the A.G. hears the case alongside the Court, he does not take part in its deliberations,
and his opinion is separate from that of the Court. See Hartley, supra note 41, at 5456. The A.G.'s opinion is rendered before the Court issues its decision, and the Court
takes it into consideration in its deliberations. Id. The Court is not obligated to follow
the A.G.'s opinion, but the A.G.'s opinion carries much weight, and even where not
adopted by the Court in the specific case, these opinions are influential in the
development of future Community law. See id.; Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 6162 (discussing the Advocate General's role and qualifications).
125. Case C-251/98, Baars, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G. Alber, [2002] 1
C.M.L.R. 49, Opinion of A.G. Alber.
126. Id. I 1-3.
127. Id. I 5-6.
128. Id. 7.
129. Id. 1 10.
130. Id. 11.
131. See id. 133.
132. See EC Treaty art. 56 (prohibiting any restriction on capital movements).
133. See Case C-251/98, Baars, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G. Alber, 50,
[2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 49, Opinion of A.G. Alber, 50:
[I]f the holding in a company reaches a size which enables the investor to
exercise a decisive influence over the undertaking's decision-making, the
right of establishment will supplement free movement of capital. Such an
investment would then additionally fulfill the criteria set out in Article 52(2),
and would be protected by the EC Treaty under two separate heads.
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Court's approach to establishment cases imports much from
recognized principles involving the free movement of services.134
Specifically, the notion that only those regulations necessitated by
national interests can justify a restriction of a fundamental freedom
3
was carried over from precedent regarding freedom of services. 1
Thus, the Court imported the test it applied to freedom of
36 from previous case law on free movement
establishment in Gebhard1
137
of services.
Gebhard discussed the right of establishment as relating to selfemployed persons, specifically a lawyer attempting to establish
himself in another Member State. 38 In evaluating an Italian law
which restricted Gebhard's ability to open a legal practice in Milan,
the Court held:
[N]ational measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the
exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must
fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the
general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of
the objective which they pursue;13 9and they must not go beyond what
is necessary in order to attain it.

134. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
the general good exception in the free movement of goods sector, and its subsequent
application in freedom of services and establishment cases).
135. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 669 (explaining "this doctrine is not only
crucial in the area of free movement of services, but has now been carried over to the
right of establishment"). Compare Case C-58/98, Proceedings Against Corsten, 2000
E.C.R. 1-7919, 1 35 (holding that, in the context of movement of services and the right
of establishment, where the host state's interest is not protected by the rules
governing the service provider in his home state, any regulation in the host state
which restricts the freedom must be "based only on rules justified by overriding
requirements relating to the public interest"), with Case C-279/80, Criminal
Proceedings Against Webb, 1981 E.C.R. 3305, 1 17, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1981),
17 (finding that the freedom to provide services, as a fundamental freedom, can only
be obstructed by rules "justified by the general good").
136. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995).
137. See Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany (In re Insurance Services), 1986
E.C.R. 3755, 1 33, [19871 2 C.M.L.R. 69 (1986), 9 33.
[T]here are imperative reasons relating to the public interest which may
justify restrictions on the freedom to provide services, provided, however,
that the rules of the State of establishment are not adequate in order to
achieve the necessary level of protection and that the requirements of the
State in which the service is provided do not exceed what is necessary in that
respect.
Id. There are similarities between In re Insurance Services and Corsten. See supra
note 135. In re InsuranceServices borrowed from Cassis de Dijon, wherein the Court
noted the "imperative requirements" exception. See supra notes 70-77 and
accompanying text.
138. Case C-55/94, Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 9 2, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, 1 2.
139. Id. 9139.
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The Court has applied this four-prong4 test in many cases involving a
restriction of a fundamental freedom.
The Court applies the wording of Article 43 literally, and will not

permit restrictions which violate the letter of its text. Centros Ltd. v.
Erhvervs-Og Selskabsstyrelsen, 4 involved Denmark's refusal of

Centros's application to register a branch in Denmark because
Centros, though incorporated in the U.K., did not actually conduct

business in the U.K. The sole purpose for Centros's incorporation in
the U.K. was to evade the Danish paid-in capital requirements. 142 For
this reason, Denmark believed that refusing to allow registration did
not violate the right of establishment. 143 In finding that the refusal

140. Though not always explicitly identified as such, the Court often considers
these four conditions in evaluating a restriction of a fundamental freedom. See, e.g.,
id. 37 (freedom of establishment); see also Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v. ErhvervsOg Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 34, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999), 34.
(freedom of establishment); Case C-153/02, Neri v, Eur. Sch. of Econ., 2003 E.C.R.
_,
I 45-46, available at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (free
movement of persons); Case C-215/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Schnitzer, 2003
E.C.R. _,
117, 2003 WL 100051 (E.C.J. Dec. 11, 2003) (free movement of services);
Case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
49, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
48 (2002),
49 (free movement of capital). Advocates General have also widely
adopted the four-part test. See Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de
Nederlandse Orde van Avocaten, 2002 E.C.R. _, Opinion of A.G. Leger, 91249,
[2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 27 (2002), Opinion of A.G. Leger, 91249 (freedom of
establishment); Case C-424/97, Haim v. Kassenzahnirztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein,
2000 E.C.R. 1-5123, Opinion of A.G. Mischo,
103, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 11 (2000),
Opinion of A.G. Mischo, 103 (freedom of establishment); Case C-120/95, Decker v.
Caisse de Maladie des Employ6s Privds, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1831, Opinion of A.G.
Tesauro, 9145, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 879 (1998), Opinion of A.G. Tesauro, 45 (free
movement of goods and free movement of services).
141. Case C-212/97, Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551.
142. Id. 9I 13, 23. Danish law required a certain minimum amount of capital be
paid into a company as a pre-requisite to incorporation (presumably intended as a
protective measure for investors), whereas the U.K. does not have the same mandate
for limited liability companies. Therefore, incorporating in the U.K. saved the
shareholder 200,000 Danish kroner. See id. 917.
143. Denmark argued that Centros's actions fell within the "van Binsbergen
exception." The so-called van Binsbergen exception provides that a Member State
may
take measures to prevent the exercise by a person providing services whose
activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of the freedom
guaranteed by Article 59 for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules
of conduct which would be applicable to him if he were established within
that State.
Case 33/74, van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, 9113, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (1974), 9113; see Case
C-148/91, Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariaat voor de Media,
1993 E.C.R. 1-487, IT 12-14 (finding acceptable, based on the van Binsbergen
exception, a Dutch law which prohibited domestically established broadcasting
organizations from participating in the establishment of broadcasting organizations in
other Member States which would direct broadcasts into the Netherlands, where the
establishment of the second broadcast organization is done to evade Dutch
regulations regarding the non-commercial character of programs, and types of
broadcast content). Finding that the Danish law failed to satisfy the four conditions
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violated Centros's right of establishment, the Court noted that "[t]he

right to form a company in accordance with the law of a Member
State and to set up branches in other Member States is inherent in the
exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment
guaranteed by the Treaty.

' 144

If the company was not violating the

law of the nation in which it was established, its intent to evade certain
obligations of the company law of another Member State was
unimportant
and the literal application of Article 43 demanded this
1 45
result.

2. Article 56-The Free Movement of Capital
Before 1994, Member States were under no absolute obligation to

'"open up their frontiers to capital from other Member States."' 146
Prior to the amendments adopted in Amsterdam, the ECJ considered
that EC Article 67 did not itself accomplish the free movement of
capital, but rather required legislative implementation. 47
Thus
Article 67 urged liberalization of capital movements, but did not have

direct effect; rather it required legislation to impose measures

loosening such restrictions.1 48 Two directives issued in the early 1960s
required for a restriction of a fundamental freedom, the Court determined that the
refusal to register the branch infringed upon the right of establishment. Case C212/97, Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459,
30, 39, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 1 30, 39.
144. Case C-212/97, Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 27, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 27.
145. See id. 26.
The provisions of the Treaty on freedom of establishment are intended
specifically to enable companies formed in accordance with the law of a
Member State and having their registered office, central administration or
principal place of business within the Community to pursue activities in
other Member States through an agency, branch or subsidiary.
Id. $ 26.
146. Case C-54/99, Association lglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister,
2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, Opinion of A.G. Saggio, 2; see also supra Part I.B.
147. See Hartley, supra note 41, at 199-200 (noting that, at least as originally
understood, the Treaty authors did not intend directives to have direct effect, but
rather required national legislation be enacted for their implementation). For a
discussion of the Court's role in the expansion of direct effect, see id. at 199-204.
148. See generally Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del
Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R. 377, %%
27-33, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52 (1984),
27-33 (recognizing
that Article 67 does not require full liberalization of capital flows and that Member
States may still impose restrictions on capital movements); Case 203/80, Criminal
Proceedings Against Casati, 1981 E.C.R. 2595, 10, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1981),
10 (noting that unlike the Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods, persons
and services, capital movements, under Article 67 need only be liberalized to the
extent necessitated by the functioning of the common market). The Court addressed
the issue of whether or not Article 67 had direct effect in Casati. In Casati, an Italian
national who resided in Germany was prevented from exporting a large sum of Italian
currency pursuant to Italian law which capped the export of national currency (at that
time, Lira) at 500,000. Id. 4. In March of 1981, the equivalent of ITL 500,000 was
approximately $500. See Currencies,Money and Gold, Fin. Times, Mar. 2, 1981, at 18
(showing the range at which the Italian Lira traded against the U.S. dollar on March
2). Casati argued that Article 67 had direct effect, and therefore he challenged the
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implemented Article 67.149 Together, they liberalized the most
common forms of both commercial and private capital movements.150
Prior to the Treaty of Maastricht and the launch of the "internal
market project," there was little case law regarding the free movement
of capital as an independent right.15 ' That is not to say that Article 67
imposed no duty on Member States to liberalize capital
movements' 5 2-particularly where capital movement was linked to the
exercise of the other fundamental freedoms, the Court did not permit
excessive restriction.'5 3
In 1985, the Commission released a White Paper on Completing the
Internal Market, which advocated even greater liberalization of
capital movements. 54 After the White Paper, efforts to achieve free
movement of capital were renewed.155 Thus, in 1988, the Council
Italian law as contrary to the Treaty. Case 203/80, Casati, 1981 E.C.R. 2595, $ 6,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 365, $ 6. The Court noted that capital movements are also "closely
connected with the economic and monetary policy of the Member States" and
therefore "it cannot be denied that complete freedom of movement of capital may
undermine the economic policy of one of the Member States or create an imbalance
in its balance of payments, thereby impairing the proper functioning of the Common
Market." Id. 9. Because Article 67(1) included the clause "to the extent necessary
to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Market," EC Treaty art. 67(1)
(repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam), the Court determined that free movement of
capital was conditional, and therefore, Article 67 required legislation for
implementation. See id. $$ 10-12.
149. Council Directive 60/921, 1960 O.J. (L 43) 921; Council Directive 63/21, 1963
O.J. (L 9) 62.
150. See Council Directive 60/921, annex I, 1960 O.J. (L 43) 921 (listing capital
movements covered by the first directive); Council Directive 63/21, annex I, 1963 O.J.
(L 9) 62 (amending the first directive and adding to the list of capital movements to
be liberalized). Most financial and banking transactions were not freed, however. See
Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 1173-74 (discussing the first and second directives
and the initial success of the efforts to liberalize capital movements).
151. See Flynn, supra note 65, at 773.
152. See generally Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del
Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R. 377, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52 (1984) (finding that restricting the
exportation of currency cannot be permitted where the currency is a payment needed
to exercise another fundamental freedom).
153. In Luisi & Carbone the Court found that an Italian law which forbade Italians
from taking more than a small amount of Italian currency out of the country
impermissibly restricted Treaty-created freedoms. Id. $137. Luisi wanted to take
enough currency to pay for medical treatment in another Member State, and Carbone
wished to travel in other Member States with enough money to cover his traveling
and tourism expenses. See id. 1 3-4. The Court determined that currency being
taken out of the nation to pay for tourism and medical treatment did not fit the
definition of a capital movement, but was rather a current payment for services. Id.
$$ 22-24. Since free movement of services did have direct effect, the Court
determined that the removal of currency from a Member State for the purpose of
paying for services in another must be allowed without limitation. See, e.g., Bermann
et al., supra note 36, at 1175 (analyzing the Court's reasoning in Luisi & Carbone).
154. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council, COM(85)310 final at 33-34 [hereinafter Completing the Internal
Market].
155. See generally Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 1175-76 (discussing the 1985
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issued Directive 88/361/EEC to address the issue. 15 6 Prior to Directive

88/361/EEC, restricting capital flows was the norm for some
The purpose of the directive was to
Community members.157
accomplish the absolute liberalization of capital flows: "Member

States shall abolish restrictions on movements of capital taking place
between persons resident in Member States."' 58 The directive was
subject to certain exceptions which included allowing measures

required to protect bank liquidity and protective measures against

short term capital movements which would threaten the Member
State's foreign exchange balance.' 59 The Directive included an

illustrative list of what would constitute a capital movement; the list
included direct investments, 160 and the Directive achieved free

movement of capital upon the expiration of the stated implementation
period, 61 but it was not until the Treaty was amended in Amsterdam
that free movement of capital was elevated to a "constitutional" right
by adoption of Article 56. 162 Article 56 mandates that "all restrictions
on the movement of capital between Member States and between
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.', 163 The

Commission has continued to make free movement of capital a
priority in recent years1 64
Article 56 liberalizes both capital flows and payments, but for the
purposes of golden shares, only the movement of capital is relevant.
Capital movements are "those resources used for, or capable of,
investment intended to generate revenue.', 65 In the Commission's
view, direct investments-included in the definition of capital laid out
in Directive 88/361/EEC-are to be treated as a capital movement,
White Paper and the subsequent adoption of the 1988 Directive).
156. Council Directive 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5.
157. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 1172-73 (noting that while some Member
States, such as the Netherlands and Germany permitted liberal movement of capital,
others, specifically France, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, were much more
restrictive); see generally Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 123; see also Case C-251/98,
Baars v. Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, 2000
E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G. Alber, 23, [2000] 1 C.M.L.R. 49 (2000), Opinion of
A.G. Alber, $ 23.
158. Council Directive 88/361, art. 1, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5, 6.
159. Id. at 6.
160. Id. at 11.
161. See, e.g., Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et
6 ("It should be noted in that regard that
de l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955,
restrictions on movements of capital were abolished by Council Directive 88/361/EEC
of 24 June 1988.").
162. See Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 123 (noting the elevation of free
movement of capital to "constitutional" status).
163. EC Treaty art. 56, 1; see also Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 124 (discussing
the effect of adopting Article 56).
164. See generally Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 124 ("From approximately ten
judgments between 1957 and 1993, the Court delivered 17 judgments directly
concerning capital movements between 1994 and 2002.").
165. Flynn, supra note 65, at 776.
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and thus protected by the Treaty.166 The Court has also adopted this
view, accepting the definition as appropriate.'67
The ECJ has defined the reach of this freedom broadly: In
Svensson & Gustavsson6 s the ECJ held that legislation which "[is] of a
nature to dissuade individuals"' 69 from the exercise of their Treaty
rights is restrictive. 7 ' A law which has the potential to restrict an
investment is therefore contrary to the obligations of Article 56.171 In
Trummer & Mayer the Court held that a law permitting only
mortgages backed in Austrian shillings to be recorded constituted a
restriction in the free movement of capital.'
Fearing that such a
requirement would inhibit the exercise of free movement of capital,
the Court declared it incompatible with Treaty law. 73 Thus, not only
would the Court disallow direct restrictions, but it would also strike
down measures which may indirectly restrict the free movement of
capital as well. 174
Not long after the amendments in Maastricht mandated the free
movement of capital, the Court held that free movement of capital
had direct effect. 7 5 In Sanz de Lera,'17 6 the Court reviewed a Spanish
law which required prior authorization for the exportation of currency
over a certain value.'7 7 First, the Court determined that requiring
166. See Communication, supra note 20, I 3, 8.
167. See, e.g., C-222/97, In re The Application to Register Land by Trummer &
Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1661,
21, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1143 (1999),
21 ("[Tjhe
nomenclature in respect of movements of capital annexed to Directive 88/361 still has
the same indicative value, for the purposes of defining the notion of capital
movements, as it did before the entry into force of [Article 56] et seq.").
168. Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et de
l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955.
169. See Flynn, supra note 65, at 779 (stating that the "starting-point for the
identification of a restriction is Svensson & Gustavsson).
170. See Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustavsson, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955, 10.
171. See Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 125.
172. Case C-222/97, Trummer & Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1661,
34, [2000] 3
C.M.L.R. 1143, 34.
173. The law did not per se forbid people from holding mortgages backed by other
currencies, id. 5, but did forbid the registration of such mortgages, and the Court
found that the inability of people to record those mortgages might deter them from
obtaining such mortgages, id. 34. The regulation might impair the free movement
of capital because "rules are liable to dissuade the parties concerned from
denominating a debt in the currency of another Member State, and may thus deprive
them of a right which constitutes a component element of the free movement of
capital and payments." Id. 26.
174. See id. 26.
175. See Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 & C-250/94, Criminal Proceedings
Against Sanz de Lera & Others, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4821,
43, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631
(1995), 1 43 (holding that Article 73 (now 56) confers rights on individuals upon
which they may rely).
176. Id.
177. Id. $ 5-6. Any individual taking more than PTA 1,000,000 out of the country
was required to obtain prior authorization for its removal. Id. 6. As of December
14, 1995, that equaled approximately $8,300. Currency and Money, Fin. Times, Dec.
14, 1995, at 34.
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consent from governmental authorities effectively gave those
authorities discretionary powers over whether to restrict the free
movement of capital." 8 Permitting the freedom to be dependent upon

the discretion of an administrative authority is "such as to render that

freedom illusory." '79 Despite the validity of the purpose of the
scheme-to prevent illegal activity such as money laundering-the
Court held that the means chosen were not proportionate.8 s Because
the Spanish government could have achieved its objective with less

restrictive means, by instead implementing a system of prior
declaration,' the Court held that the principle of proportionality was
not met.

2

Thus, the holding of Sanz de Lera was very important in

the golden share cases, for it illustrated that any acceptable restrictive
scheme must be the least restrictive means by which to achieve the
The Court applies this principle of
stated objective.'83
proportionality"8 whenever a fundamental freedom is restricted, from
the free movement of goods in Cassis de Dijon,"5 to the right to
Sanz de Lera
provide services in In re Insurance Services.'8 6
established the importance of the principle in the context of capital

movements.
Despite such broad interpretations, it is also clear that the

protection against restrictions is not absolute. Thus, even where there
is a valid justification under the EC Treaty, the Court will scrutinize a
national law which infringes upon a fundamental freedom. 7 Certain

principles must be met in order to permit a restriction. Using the four

178. Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 & C-250/94, Sanz de Lera, 1995 E.C.R. I4821, IT 24-25, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631, $$ 24-25.
179. Id. 25.
180. Id. $$ 26-28.
181. See id.
182. Id. $$ 22-23 (stating that since Spain's objective can justify a restriction in the
free movement of capital, it is necessary to determine if it is using the least restrictive
means possible to meet that goal). The principle of proportionality is one of several
foundational general principles of law that the ECJ has adopted which allow the
Court's review to have more bite. See generally Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 31,
171-79 (presenting the case law pertaining to the development of the principle of
proportionality); see also infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
183. See Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 & C-250/94, Sanz de Lera, 1995 E.C.R. I4821, $ 27-29, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631 (1995), 1 27-29.
184. See infra note 191 and accompanying text (defining proportionality).
185. Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979).
186. Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany (In re Insurance Services), 1986 E.C.R.
3755, 1 27, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69 (1986), 1 27.
187. See generally Case C-302/97, Konle v. Republik Osterreich, 1999 E.C.R. I3099, $ 37-40, [2000] 2 C.M.L.R. 963 (1999), $ 37-40 (examining an Austrian law
which had an acceptable objective-town and country planning-but nonetheless was
unacceptable); Case C-423/98, Alfredo Albore, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5965, $$ 18-19, [2002] 3
C.M.L.R. 10 (2000), 1 18-19 (considering an Italian law which might be justified
based on the public security exception, but which appeared to be unnecessarily
restrictive).
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step analysis developed in In re Insurance Services,188 carried over to

89 the Court first examines if
the right of establishment in Gebhard,'
the objective is acceptable. If it is, the means implemented must still
be limited in scope so as to not go beyond what is needed to achieve

them. 9 ° This is the principle of proportionality. 9 '

The Court has found that some restrictions might be within the

192
parameters permitted by the Treaty, though such instances are rare.
For example, the ECJ interpreted the scope of Article 58's public
security exception in Albore 9 3 An Italian law forbade the sale of land

to foreign nationals where the land was located in an area decreed by
the Minister of Defense to be one of military importance. 94 Despite
the Court's recognition of a public security exception under Article
58, it held that the infringing law must still meet the principle of

proportionality.

95

In order to satisfy the requirements for such an

exception, the threat posed by foreign ownership of the land in
question must be "real, specific and serious ' 196 as well as one which
could not "be countered by less restrictive procedures."1' 97 Not having

sufficient factual information regarding the specific nature of the
threat to the public security by foreign ownership of the coastal land,

the Court left it to the Italian court to determine whether such a
threat existed, and, if it did, whether198the measure was as minimally
restrictive as possible in addressing it.
In Konle v. Austria 99 the Court considered a law mandating prior
authorization for non-nationals wishing to purchase land in the Tyrol

(Alpine) region of the country, which was of environmental
concern."° The stated purpose of the law in question was for the
27, [1987] 2
188. Case 205/84, In re Insurance Services, 1986 E.C.R. 3755,
C.M.L.R. 69, T127.
189. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995).
190. See James Hanlon, European Community Law 67 (2d ed. 2000).
191. See generally id. Hanlon notes that the principle of proportionality, though
similar to the U.S. "reasonableness" test, is a more rigorous inquiry. Id. The principle
is embodied in Article 5 of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty art. 5 ("Any action by the
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Treaty."). For a more comprehensive analysis of the principle of proportionality, as
well as examples of its application in various sectors of Community law, see Hanlon,
supra note 190, at 67-70.
192. The Treaty expressly permits some restrictions. See supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text.
193. Case C-423/98, Alfredo Albore, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5965, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 10
(2000).
194. Id. 5.

195. Id. 1[ 19, 24.
196. Id. T122.
197. Id.
198. Id. 9123.
199. Case C-302/97, Konle v. Republik Osterreich, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3099, [2000] 2
C.M.L.R. 963 (1999).
200. Id.
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general national interest of urban planning.0 1 While the Court
accepted that such an environmental concern was valid, 2 it reiterated
the principle that "[a] procedure of prior authorisation... which
entails, by its very purpose, a restriction on the free movement of
capital, can be regarded as compatible with Article 73b [now 56] of
the Treaty only on certain conditions. ' 2 3 Austria had secured a
derogation to maintain discretionary rules regarding the acquisition of
secondary residences in its accession agreement. 2' The purpose of the
restriction, though not one explicitly condoned in Article 58, was
considered an imperative interest, and thus could, under the right
circumstances, justify some restriction.2 5
However, since the specific law that prohibited Konle's purchase
was not one which had existed at the date of accession, but rather was
a replacement (and significantly different)20 6 law for one which had
subsequently been declared unconstitutional, it was not covered by
the derogation.2 7 Because the system of review in place was not
proportionate to the purpose of the restriction, it conflicted with
Treaty obligations.2 8
In Eglise de Scientologie the Court evaluated a French law that
required prior authorization for any foreign investment which might
be connected to the exercise of public authority, or which might pose
a threat to public policy, health or security.2 9 The Court determined
that a system of prior authorization is per se restrictive,2 0 and, to be
acceptable, such a system must clearly delineate the criteria required
for authorization. 2 ' The French law in question was neither specific

201. See id. 37.
202. See generally id. 40.
[A] Member State can justify its requirement of prior authorisation by
relying on a town and country planning objective such as maintaining, ...a
permanent population and an economic activity independent of the tourist
sector in certain regions, the restrictive measure inherent in such a
requirement can be accepted only if [certain conditions are met].
Id.
203. See id. 39. Those conditions are that the measure be non-discriminatory,
necessary and proportionate. See id. I 40, 42.
204. See id. IT 14, 25. The derogation allowed Austria to continue to apply
restrictions which existed at the time of accession, even those which were applicable
only to foreigners. See id.
22-25.
205. See id. 40 (finding that certain goals of town and country planning can fall
within the general interest and thus justify restrictive measures, provided that the
measures are proportionate and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objective).
206. See id.
53-54.
207. Id. 54.
208. Id. 56.
209. Case C-54199, Association tglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister,
2000 E.C.R. 1-1335.
210. See id. 14.
211. See id. [21-22.
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nor clear enough to permit such broad restrictions.1 2 However, the
Court did state that there may be cases where a system of prior
declaration is not sufficient to safeguard the interests of public policy
or public security, and a system of prior authorization may be
acceptable.2 3 Thus, the Court left some hope for the defense of such
schemes in the future.
But tglise also shows that this is a high burden to meet. The law
must relate to a "genuine and sufficiently serious threat ' 21 4 and
indicate to investors the specific circumstances in which prior
authorization is needed. 215 Legal certainty is required so as to apprise
individuals as to the extent of any rights and duties that they have
under the Treaty.2t 6
3. Which Freedom to Use?
The Court often develops a test for one freedom, and extends its
application to another when an appropriate case is brought. 2 7 Thus,
some important doctrines apply to several, or all, fundamental
freedoms.2 8 In some cases more than one Treaty obligation is at
212. Id. The French law in question was very broad, and required a foreign
investor to get prior authorization from the Minister in charge of the Economy for
any investment in an endeavor which was involved, even occasionally, with the
exercise of official authority, or which might threaten public policy, security or health.
Id. 7. The Court noted that in order for an activity to qualify for inclusion in the
public policy, health or security exception there must be a "sufficiently serious threat
to a fundamental interest of society," and that such determination could not be made
unilaterally by a Member State. Id. 17.
213. See id. % 19.
214. Id. 9120.
215. Id. 9 21.
216. Id. 22. _1glise de Scientologie holds:
Article 73d(1)(b) of the EC Treaty must be interpreted as precluding a
system of prior authorisation for direct foreign investments which confines
itself to defining in general terms the affected investments as being
investments that are such as to represent a threat to public policy and public
security, with the result that the persons concerned are unable to ascertain
the specific circumstances in which prior authorisation is required.
Id. Legal certainty, like proportionality, is a general principle of Community law, and
is therefore always a consideration. See Hartley, supra note 41, at 142. It requires that
laws be predictable and certain, thus providing notice as to what satisfies the law. Id.
For further discussion on the principle of legal certainty, see id. at 142-47.
217. See Flynn, supra note 65, at 804-05. Flynn notes that in five years, the Court
has developed capital law as fully as the law pertaining to other freedoms, which took
thirty years to develop. Because the Court does take from one to apply to another,
this huge development with regard to capital movement will impact the Court's
analysis of violations of other freedoms. Id. The Court is able to, and will, "pick
elements from the case law on capital and to relay echoes from it in those fields." Id.
at 805; see also supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text (noting the development of
the four-prong test in the services case law and its subsequent utilization in
establishment case law and discussing the extension of the concept of "overriding
national interests" from free movement of goods to services and establishment).
218. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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issue, and it is unclear which body of law the Court will apply. 219
Frequently there is overlap between free movement of capital and the
freedom of establishment.2 0 In such instances, the law relating to
either freedom may be applied.2 l Compounding the confusion is the
clause in Article 43 that states that the freedom of establishment ' 22is2
"subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.
Likewise, Article 58 includes the reservation that the Chapter on
capital "shall be without prejudice to the applicability of restrictions
on the right of establishment. 22 3 This may imply that protection is
only extended to one freedom where both are implicated, but as
Advocate General Alber noted in Baars:
[Tihe reservations do not signify that conduct can be protected only
under one of these fundamental freedoms. Were any reference to
capital movements ipso facto to preclude application of the chapter
on the freedom of establishment, that fundamental freedom would
lose any practical meaning, since establishment in another Member
State generally involves a transfer of capital.224
Certainly, the Court only addresses those questions that are
presented. However, as is evident from the golden share cases, the
Court is selective about which law it uses to ground its decision. In
Baars, Advocate General Alber suggested:
(1) where the free movement of capital is directly restricted such
that only an indirect obstacle to establishment is created, only the
rules on capital movements apply; (2) where the freedom of
establishment is directly restricted such that the ensuing obstacle to
establishment leads indirectly to a reduction of capital flows
between Member States, only the rules on the freedom of
establishment apply... ; (3) where there is direct intervention
affecting both the free movement of capital and the freedom of
establishment, both fundamental freedoms apply, and the national
measure must satisfy the requirements of both. 22
Theoretically this is a sound formula, but in practice the line may be
more difficult to draw. Accordingly, the Court has often avoided the
issue by making a decision on one of the freedoms, and not addressing
the other, even if it is raised.22 6
219. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 65, at 788-91.
220. See generally id.
221. See id.
222. EC Treaty art. 43.
223. EC Treaty art. 58.
224. Case
C-251/98,
Baars
v.
Inspecteur
der
Belastingen
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G.
Alber, 13, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 49 (2000), Opinion of A.G. Alber, 13.
225. Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 129-30.
226. See Flynn, supra note 65, at 789. Flynn notes that the Court followed the same
pattern in X & Y v. Riksskatteverket, Case C-200/98, X & Y v. Riksskatteverket, 1999
E.C.R. 1-8261, where "it ruled that, in the absence of justification, such a difference of
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In the past, the Court pragmatically opted to decide only the
establishment issue, because "once an incompatibility appears to
arise, [regarding the right of establishment] there is no purpose in
examining the implications of the provisions on capital. ' 227 Now that
there is a wealth of capital case law,228 the Court has declined to
address9 the freedom of establishment issue in any of the golden share
22
cases.

It seems the Court bases its rulings on the law most amenable to the
precise issue at bar. The Court logically relied on its existing
precedent in deciding the golden share cases. 230 There were other
options, however: In the opinions presented by Advocate General
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in each of the golden share cases, he advocated
analysis under the right of establishment. 231 Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer

found that in the golden share cases the restriction of the free
movement of capital was incidental to the restriction on the freedom
of establishment. 23 2

This is similar to A.G. Alber's line-drawing

treatment is contrary to the rules on freedom of establishment and that it was not
necessary to examine whether the rules on free movement of capital preclude
legislation such as that in question in the main proceedings." Flynn, supra note 65, at
789 (paraphrasing X & Y, at $1 28, 30). But see Case C-484/93, Svensson &
Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et de l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955
(discussing both the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital
issues).
227. Flynn, supra note 65, at 804.
228. See id. passim for an excellent discussion of the development of case law
pertaining to the free movement of capital.
229. See Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, $ 86, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), 86; Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R.
1-4641, $ 52, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 19 (2003),
52; Case C-367/98, Commission v.
Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, $ 56, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), $ 56; Case C-483/99,
Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781,
56, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), 56;
Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, $ 59, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
50 (2002), 9 59. While this frustrates the inquiry as to the actual format of analysis the
Court would apply, this Comment presumes that the conclusion would be the same in
these cases.
230. Since the adoption of Article 56, a number of cases in the capital sector have
been decided that provided a suitable framework for considering the acceptability of
restrictive golden shares. See Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de
Paris v. Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335; Case C-302/97, Konle v. Republik
Osterreich, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3099, [2000] 2 C.M.L.R. 963 (1999); Joined Cases C-163/94,
165/94, & 250/94, Criminal Proceedings Against Sanz de Lera & Others, 1995 E.C.R.
1-4821, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631 (1995).
231. Joined Cases C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), & Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R.
-, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 9 36; Joined
Cases C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48
(2002), C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48
(2002), & C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48
(2002), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, $121.
232. Joined Cases C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & Case
C-98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G.
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, $ 36.
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formula in Baars,233 where he concluded that the appropriate rules to
apply were those relating to establishment, because Baars' owned all
of the shares in a company.3 4 This indicates that some cases infringe
both freedoms, and the reason for the Court's application of one body
of law over another may be apparent only by considering the
development of relevant precedent.
C. The 1997 Communication
Since the mid-1990s, the Commission has made it clear that it will
not tolerate restrictions on the free movement of capital and freedom
of establishment.235
In fact, in 1997, the Commission issued a
Communication which unambiguously stated its position on Article
56, expressly "indicat[ing], to national authorities and economic
operators in Member States" how it interprets Articles 43 and 56.236
Because acquiring a controlling stake in a company is considered a
capital movement, 37 Article 56 must be considered with regard to
investment. Additionally, such acquisitions are "also covered under
23
the scope of the right of establishment,""
thus also requiring
compatibility with Article 43. Therefore, the Commission, at least,
recognizes that golden share devices, which directly or indirectly
regulate the acquisition of shares, implicate both Treaty rights.239
The National Treatment Principle prohibits discriminatory
treatment of the nationals of other Member States. 240 The principle
has always been a part of the Treaty; initially embodied in Article 7,
and now in Article 12: "Within the scope of application of this Treaty,
and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. 24 ' Only
in very limited circumstances can any law which violates this principle
be acceptable.242 Because a discriminatory regulation unequivocally
233. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
234. Case
C-251/98,
Baars
v.
Inspecteur
der
Belastingen
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G.
Alber,
34, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 49 (2000), Opinion of A.G. Alber,
34 ("The
distinction in question presents no problems in the present case. It is clear that the
situation is one of establishment, since all the shares are owned by one person.").
235. See, e.g., Communication, supra note 20, at 1 1.
236. Id. 2.
237. Id. 3.
238. Id. 4.
239. See id. 1$ 6-9.
240. EC Treaty art. 12. Though not expressed in the treaty, Article 12 mandates
non-discrimination based on nationality, and thus requires that a citizen from another
Member State be treated equivalently to a citizen of the Member State in question.
The Court has interpreted this to be a "general doctrine of equality." Hartley, supra
note 41, at 130. The National Treatment terminology comes from GATT. See
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 3, 61 Stat. A-11, A-18, 55
U.N.T.S. 188,204-06.
241. EC Treaty art. 12.
242. See Communication, supra note 20, $ 5(i)-7. The Commission recognized
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conflicts, not only with provisions in the Treaty, but with the
underlying purpose of the EU,243 such measures presumptively

infringe upon Treaty obligations.2 4 Such measures can only co-exist
with Treaty obligations if they
are one of the few exceptions explicitly
245
granted by the Treaty itself.

Regulations that are non-discriminatory on their face are also
scrutinized carefully, though the criteria are slightly more ambiguous,

leaving more to the court's discretion. 246 Applying by analogy judicial

doctrines that were developed to limit Member State restrictions on
the free movement of services2 47 and the right of establishment, 24 the
Commission argued, and the Court has held, that such laws must meet

four conditions.2 49 First, they must not be applied discriminatorily.25 °

Second, the law must achieve "imperative requirements in the general
interest." 1 Third, the measure must be appropriate for attaining the
that discriminatory measures which were related to activities connected with "official
authority" might be accepted. Id.
5(i). Note, however, that the very narrow
applicability of the "official authority" exception ensures that such measures have
rarely been accepted. See, e.g., Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 631,
54, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305 (1974), 54. Additionally, the Commission recognized that
when a regulation discriminated on the basis of nationality and was justifiable under
explicit Treaty exceptions-public security, health or policy-it might be acceptable,
though "these exceptions have to be understood in a narrow sense.., and exclude
any interpretation based on economic considerations." Communication, supra note
20, T 5(i).
243. See EC Treaty pmbl. (stating that the Community was created because the
Members were "[determined] to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe,... [recognising] that the removal of existing obstacles calls for
concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair
competition").
244. See Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 41, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), 41.
245. See Communication, supra note 20, T1 5; see also supra notes 82-85 and
accompanying text (discussing the specific exceptions to the prohibition on restriction
of the freedom of establishment); supra note 108 and accompanying text (identifying
the Treaty exceptions permitting restrictions of the free movement of capital).
246. See generally Communication, supra note 20, 9 ("[T]hey are permitted in so
far as they are based on a set of objective and stable criteria which have been made
public and can be justified on imperative requirements in the general interest. In all
cases, the principle of proportionality has to be respected.").
247. See Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany (In re Insurance Services), 1986
E.C.R. 3755, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69 (1986).
248. See Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano,
1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995).
249. Communication, supra note 20, 5(ii).
250. Id.
251. Id. The Commission draws upon the Court's analysis in previous case law
pertaining to the free movement of services and the right of establishment. Cf Case
C-55/94, Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, 9 37 (reiterating
the four conditions necessary for a restriction on a fundamental freedom, the second
of which is that the measure "must be justified by imperative requirements in the
general interest"); Case 33/74, van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging
voor de Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (1974), (finding
that the Dutch refusal to permit a Dutch legal representative, residing in Belgium, to
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objective.252 Finally, the regulation must not impose 2any
restriction
53
beyond that which is necessary to achieve the objective.
The Commission also recognized that Article 296(1)(b) generates a
clear and overriding exception. 254 Article 296 unequivocally permits
Member States to implement regulations needed "for the protection
of the essential interests of its security.., connected with the
255
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material.,
However, the Commission expressed reliance on the continued
narrow interpretation of this caveat by the ECJ, and remained
confident that this exception would not become "a general
proviso
256
covering all measures taken for reasons of public security.
The Commission applied this interpretation to various mechanisms
currently in place in some Member States to determine compatibility
with EU law. 257 Essentially, the Commission declared that any
scheme requiring prior authorization for an investment, any retention
of state veto rights over important company decisions, or the right to
appoint directors to a company's board were inherently incompatible
with the obligations of Articles 56 and 43, and therefore could only be
acceptable in narrowly defined situations.
All of these
objectionable measures are common devices employed when Member
States use golden shares.259
The Commission's interpretation of the relevant Treaty Articles
provided the basis for initiating the six golden share cases.2 ° The
choice to privatize a previously state owned enterprise remains the
decision of the Member State.26 ' However, what the golden share

represent a client in an administrative proceeding was acceptable due to the specific
nature of the service provided).
252. Communication, supra note 20, 5(ii).
253. Id.
254. Id. I 5(i).
255. EC Treaty art. 296(1)(b).
256. Communication, supra note 20, 5(i).
257. Id. IT 7-8.
258. Id. 8.
259. See infra Part II (discussing the various golden share mechanisms which have
come before the ECJ).
260. See EC Treaty art. 226.
Article 226 provides the procedure for the
Commission to initiate proceedings against a Member State before the ECJ.
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its
observations.
...If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the
period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before
the Court of Justice.
Id.
261. Communication, supra note 20, n.1 (noting that such a decision is an
"economic policy choice which... falls within the exclusive competence of Member
States"); see also EC Treaty art. 295 (previously Art. 222) ("This Treaty shall in no
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cases prove is that, post-privatization, Member States do not have free
rein to regulate those companies in a manner inconsistent with the
free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment.
This Communication expressed the opinion of the Commission, and
was not binding law. 262

Actual rules pertaining to such matters

"should be left for Parliament and the Council, acting on a proposal
263
from the Commission.,

By the end of the 1990s, efforts to further integrate the internal
market and eliminate--or at least diminish-measures designed to
inhibit cross-border company activity were increased.2 4
The
Commission began initiating actions against Member States using
restrictive protective devices, such as golden shares. The obvious
restrictive nature 265 of golden shares made them uniquely vulnerable
to challenge.
II. THE GOLDEN SHARE CASES
This part discusses the six golden share cases in turn. Each case
provides unique insight into the Court's method of interpreting Treaty
law and building upon precedent. Furthermore, analyzing each case
in turn demonstrates how these cases incrementally defined the scope
of the free movement of capital.
Even before the commencement of infringement proceedings
related to golden shares, commentators criticized golden shares for
their "sweeping legal nature. ' 2 6 Despite the recent judicial activity,267
way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property
ownership.").
262. The Commission does not have the ability to create binding law. For a
discussion of the Commission's role in the EU, see Bermann et al., supra note 36, at
42-51; Hartley, supra note 41, at 11-17.
263. Eur. Parl. Doc. O.J. 2002 (C 21E) 338, 339 (Minutes, Apr. 5, 2001). The
European Parliament has asked the Commission to stop using the Communication
alone as the basis for the infringement proceedings against Member States and urged
it to replace the Communication with a proposed directive. Id. at 339 ("Calls on the
Commission to cease using the abovementioned communication as the basis for its
infringement procedures and immediately to propose a directive to replace the
abovementioned communication.").
264. In 2001 the Commission set up a High Level Group of Company Law Experts
to advise it on a suitable framework for Community company law. See High Level
Group of Company Law Experts, Report on a Modem Regulatory Framework for
Company
Law
in
Europe
1
(Nov.
4,
2002),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/company/company/modern/index.htm
[hereinafter High Level Group Report (November)]. In addition to the report on
company law, the Group prepared a report on takeover law as well. See High Level
Group of Company Law Experts, Report on Issues Related to Takeover Bids 1 (Jan.
10,
2002)
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/en/
company/company/news/02-24.htm [hereinafter High Level Group Report (January)].
265. See supra notes 12-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various
ways in which golden shares protect a company or governmental interest by
implementing restrictions on a number of activities.
266. Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 123.
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golden shares are still quite common throughout the EU, 268 and thus
an analysis of the Court's decisions will assist in predicting the nature
of the Court's scrutiny and the outcome of future cases.
The 1988 Directive included direct investments in the illustrative list
of operations to be liberalized,269 which was subsequently understood
to have been incorporated into Article 56.270 For the purposes of the
directive, direct investments are defined as:
Investments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial, industrial
or financial undertakings, and which serve to establish or to
maintain lasting and direct links between the person providing the
capital and the entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which
the capital is made available in order to carry on an economic
activity. This concept must therefore be understood in its widest
sense.271

A golden share, by its very nature, potentially restricts
investments.2 72 In some cases, the golden share sets caps on the
amount of shares that an individual may own.273 In others, the
government maintains such a level of control as to render the
investment less attractive.274 In recent years, the Court has had the

267. See infra Parts II.B., II.C.
268. For example, there are an additional twenty-five in the U.K. alone. See, e.g.,
Terry Macalister, Ruling Leaves UK Firms Vulnerable, The Guardian, May 14, 2003,
at 18, available at LEXIS News Library, Guardian File. See infra Part III.A. for a
discussion of the pending cases and potential cases.
269. See Council Directive 88/361 for the Implementation of Article 67 of the
Treaty, 1988 OJ (L 178) 5, 8-11; see also Case C-54/99, Association tglise de
Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, Opinion of A.G. Saggio,

3.
270. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
271. Council Directive 88/361 for the Implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty,
1988 O.J. (L 178) 5, 11; see also Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. I4781, %6, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), 6.
272. See supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
273. See Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581,
9, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), 9 (noting the provision in Spanish law 5/1995 which allows the
state to require ministerial authorization before any person or legal entity acquires
more than ten percent of a recently privatized company's voting shares); Case C98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641,
11, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R.
19 (2003), 11 (discussing article 40(1) of the Articles of Association of the British
Airports Authority which prevents persons from acquiring more than fifteen percent
of the voting shares); Case C-483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, $ 9, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 49, 9 (discussing the French requirement that prior authorization must be
obtained before any person or legal entity acquires more than one-fifth, one-tenth, or
one-third of the voting rights in Elf-Aquitaine); Case C-367/98, Commission v.
Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, j 11, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002),
11 (noting that
Article 13(3) of Portuguese Law No. 11/90 permits the government to limit the total
number of shares held by foreigners in certain designated companies).
274. See, e.g., CAmara, supra note 12, at 504.
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opportunity to evaluate both of these schemes.

75

Because the

movement of capital is at issue, there are only a few permissible
justifications for any restriction, and the Court has also begun to
identify which motives can be acceptable. 76

A. Commission v. Italy

In May 2000, the Court decided the first of the golden share cases.277
An Italian law required that, prior to relinquishing control of any state

controlled company operating in certain sectors, a provision be

installed to reserve certain powers to the Minister of the Treasury.2 78
These special powers in effect constitute a golden share retained by

the state. The government reserved the right to appoint at least one
director to the board and the ability to veto certain company
decisions. 279 The government inserted these provisions into the
statutes of ENI SpA, STET SpA and Telecom Italia SpA.280

companies

operated

in

the

energy

sector

(ENI)

and

The

the

telecommunications sector (STET and Telecom Italia).81
Following the necessary procedure, the Commission brought the
case to the ECJ, pursuant to Article 226.282 Before the Court, the
275. See infra Part II.A.-C. for a discussion of the six cases in which the court has
evaluated various golden share schemes, and its determination of which motivations
can be acceptable.
276. See Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809 (permitting
the use of the Belgian golden share); Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, %71
(identifying certain industries which might merit some protective measures). Because
the principles of proportionality and legal certainty are general legal principles of the
Community, they apply in all circumstances. For a comprehensive discussion of the
origin and application of general principles of Community law, see Hartley, supra
note 41, at 130-54. Thus, only those schemes which ensure the protection interest of
the affected investor can be justified. Such safeguards include judicial review,
precisely worded restrictions, and specific constraints on the governmental restriction.
See, e.g., Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, $$ 48-52, [2002]
2 C.M.L.R. 50 (2002), 11 48-52.
277. Belguim, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809,
48-52, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50,
48-52.
278. See id. 3.
279. Id.
280. Id. 15-6.
281. Though the specific industries involved were unimportant in this case,
retrospectively, it is possible that Italy might have successfully defended the system as
necessary for the protection of overriding reasons in the national interest, because the
Court has since stated that both sectors are important enough to justify restricting a
fundamental freedom. See Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581,
71, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), 71 (noting that protecting the telecommunications
industry may constitute a valid public security justification for restricting the free
movement of capital); see also Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I4809, 46, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50 (2002), 46 ("[T]he safeguarding of energy supplies
in the event of a crisis.., falls undeniably within the ambit of a legitimate public
interest."). Of course, the regulation would still have to be proportionate. See, e.g.,
Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister, 2000
E.C.R. 1-1335, 18.
282. Case C-58/99, Italy, 2000 E.C.R. 1-3811,
7-11; see also EC Treaty art. 226.
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Commission argued that the law conflicted with Treaty obligations

and failed to meet the necessary four conditions, as outlined in the

1997 Communication. 283 Furthermore, the Commission argued that
the law gave the Italian government too much discretion, and
therefore the ability to apply the law in an arbitrary and

discriminatory manner.2 4

Here, the Italian government conceded that Law No. 474 was
incompatible with the law of the European Community.2 85
Accordingly, the Court had no need to scrutinize the law to determine

whether it actually restricted capital movements or establishment, or
if any such restriction was in fact impermissible. But the Court did
not have to wait long before the issue again appeared.
B. The OriginalGolden Share Cases
On June 4, 2002, the ECJ decided three cases regarding the use of
golden shares. 286 The Court's analysis of the various forms of the
golden shares outlines the basic structure of the current test of golden
share compatibility with Community law. 287 Each case resolves

different and important issues.
Before rendering its decision, the Court considered the opinion of
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 288 who recommended that

the Court dismiss the Commission's actions against the nondiscriminatory measures of Portugal, Belgium, and France. 28 9 The

Article 226 provides the proper procedure for the Commission to bring an action
before the ECJ:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its
observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period
laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.
Id. Thus, the Commission sent a formal notice to the Italian Republic, informing it
that in the Commission's opinion, the law violated Articles 43, 49, and 56. Case C58/99, Italy, 2000 E.C.R. 1-3811,
7. After receiving a response from the Italian
government, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion, giving Italy two months to
comply. Id. 8. Italy failed to respond within the time limit. Id.
9-10.
283. See supra note 20 and text accompanying note 249.
284. See Case C-58/99, Italy, 2000 E.C.R. 1-3811, %13.
285. Id. 14.
286. Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
48 (2002); C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49
(2002); C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, [20021 2 C.M.L.R. 50
(2002).
287. See generally Fleisher, supra note 19.
288. See supra note 124 (explaining the role of the A.G.). For a more complete
discussion of the A.G.'s opinion in the golden share cases, see infra Part II.D.
289. Joined Cases C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. _, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. -,
[2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), & C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. _, [2002] 2
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A.G. relied primarily on Article 295, which asserts that the Treaty

laws do not prejudice the property law of the Member States.2 9 °
Company shares and the rights which they entail are property. 29 The
Court, however, did not agree, and only briefly addressed the

Advocate General's argument before swiftly rejecting it, noting that
Member States' systems of property ownership are not exempt from
Treaty rules.2" The Court cited one of its important precedents,
Factortame II, to show that Member States may only exercise the

powers that they retain consistently with Community law.293
1. Commission v. Portugal

The Commission's strongest case was against the Portuguese golden
share rules. 294
The Portuguese law in question established a
framework for all privatizations.2 95 One objective of the law was "to

permit widespread participation by Portuguese citizens in the share
capital of undertakings. "296 Presumably to further that goal, Article
13(3) of Law No. 11/90 was discriminatory on its face, allowing

legislation to "limit the overall amount of shares which may be

acquired or subscribed for by foreign entities. '297 The Commission
brought the action to challenge specific decree laws, three of which
implemented a discriminatory measure. 98
Additionally, the
Commission objected to certain decree laws which, though not facially

discriminatory, nonetheless restricted free movement of capital by
limiting to ten percent the total number of shares any individual or
entity could legally hold without government authorization.29 9

C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 92. One of the laws in
question capped the amount of voting shares any single person (or legal entity) could
own at ten percent. This law applied irrespective of the shareholder's nationality, and
applied to any "single, natural or legal person." Id. 14.
290. EC Treaty art. 295.
291. See generally Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. -,
[2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48, C-483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, & C-503/99,
Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -, [20021 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer, 92.
292. Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 48, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, T 48.
293. See Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp., ex parte
Factortame Ltd., 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905,
16-17, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 589, $1 16-17
[hereinafter Factortame 11] (noting that Member States may implement registration
requirements for vessels in so far as they do not conflict with International law or EU
law).
294. See Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. _, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48,
C-483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. __ [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, & C-503/99, Belgium, 2002
E.C.R. -_, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 22.
295. See Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
10-14, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
48,
10-14.
296. Id. J 10 (quoting Article 3 of Law No. 11/90).
297. Id.
298. See id. T[13.
299. See id. 14.
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Regarding the discriminatory aspect of the Portuguese law in
question, the Commission's argument followed the rationale of the
1997 Communication.3"0 First, the Commission contended that the
true purpose behind such protective measures was to control intraCommunity investment.301
The Commission further noted that
discriminatory measures are clearly incompatible with Article 43 and
Article 56, unless they are within one of the express exceptions.3 2
The Portuguese government contended that since it had endeavored
"as a matter of policy, not to use the powers conferred on it by those
provisions,"' 3 3 Portugal had not in practice violated its obligations
under the EC Treaty.3"
As for the non-discriminatory measures, the Commission again
referred to the 1997 Communication,3 5 claiming that the measures
were incompatible with Community law. Only those laws which are
"based on a set of objective and stable criteria which have been made
public and can be justified on imperative requirements in the general
interest 30 6 and which meet the principle of proportionality,30 7 can be
accepted.3 ' The Commission contended that Portugal did not meet
these requirements.30 9 Portugal argued that (a) the scheme was
applied to both foreigners and nationals, and was therefore nondiscriminatory, and (b) the measures were justified by "overriding
31
requirements of the general interest.""
Portugal asserted that
safeguarding its nation's financial interests was an imperative national
interest,31 1 which justified a restriction of the freedom of establishment
and the free movement of capital.
The Court disregarded entirely A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's
analysis of Article 295,312 and instead evaluated the national measures
under Article 56.313 The Court seized upon this opportunity to
formulate an appropriate structure of analysis for golden share
restrictions based on the free movement of capital. First, the Court
noted that Article 56 bars such restrictions.3 4 Trummer & Mayer

300. See Communication, supra note 20.
301. Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 20, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, 20.
302. Id. 22 (citing Communication, supra note 20).
303. Id. 29.
304. Id.
305. Id. 22 (quoting Communication, supra note 20, $ 9).
306. Id.
307. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
308. See Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, $ 22, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48,
22 (quoting Communication, supra note 20, 9).
309. See id. $$ 23-27.
310. Id. 31.
311. Id. 32.
312. Id. 28 ("Article 222 [now Article 295] of the Treaty is irrelevant in the
present case.").
313. See id. $$ 36-54.
314. Id. $ 36.
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clearly held that such a restriction need not have a direct restrictive
effect; it is enough that the measure may indirectly hinder the free
movement of capital.3 15

The Court then addressed the discriminatory aspects of the
measure. The Court rejected Portugal's argument that because the
discriminatory rules were not actually used they did not violate
Article 56,316 because such a policy failed to meet the principle of legal
certainty.317 Portugal's practice "cannot be regarded as constituting

the proper fulfilment of a Member State's obligations under the
Treaty, since they maintain, for the persons concerned, a state of
'
uncertainty."318
Thus, an administrative policy of not applying an
existing measure discriminatorily was not a valid defense to an alleged
breach of EC 2Treaty
obligations.3 19
3 0
Community law.

This remains well-settled

Next the Court evaluated the non-discriminatory measure
embedded in Decree-Law No. 380/93, which required prior
authorization before an individual or entity could hold shares totaling
more than ten percent of the voting capital.321 Having already dealt
with systems of prior authorization in Sanz de Lera3 22 and Eglise de
Scientologie,3 23 the Court had a well-developed body of law from
which to draw.

Without hesitation, the Court dismissed Portugal's argument that
315. See Case C-222/97, Trummer & Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1661,
26, [2000] 3
C.M.L.R. 1143 (1999), 26 (holding that measures which may deter investment, even
if they do not prohibit or directly restrict it, violate Article 56).
316. See generally Case C-367/98, Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
41, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R.48, 41.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See id. IT 41-42. Interestingly, in earlier days, the Commission seemed to
accept such promises not to use discriminatory measures which existed. See Graham
& Prosser, supra note 8, at 151. In the days of the EEC, the Commission objected to
France's attempt to limit a sale resulting in foreign ownership to fifteen percent but
accepted a limit of twenty percent on the condition that such limits would not be
enforced against other members of the Community. Though this specifically applied
to the original sale of the company, the golden share was inserted to ensure adequate
State control in the post-privatization period. Id. at 151-52.
320. See, e.g., Case 167/73, Commission v. France, 1974 E.C.R. 359, $ 47-48, [1974]
2 C.M.L.R. 216 (1974),
47-48 (holding that even though a French requirement that
at least seventy-five percent of the crew on some vessels be French was not applied
against nationals of other Member States, the wording of the regulation created
uncertainty, and thus France had failed to meet its obligation of free movement of
workers).
321. See Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
43-44, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
48,
43-44 (declining to accept Portugal's argument that because the measure is not
discriminatory, it is acceptable).
322. Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94, & C-250/94, Criminal Proceedings Against
Sanz de Lera & Others, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4821, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631 (1995). See supra
notes 175-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sanz de Lera.
323. Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister,
2000 E.C.R. 1-1335; see also supra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
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because the measure did not discriminate based on nationality, it was
compatible with the Treaty.3 24 Article 56 does not permit such
restrictions.3 1 5 Any rule with the potential to dissuade investors from
other Member States from investing is "liable... to render the free
movement of capital illusory, 3 26 and as such is incompatible with
Article 56. This is firmly settled case law.327
Since no blanket rule permits non-discriminatory restrictions, the
Court considered whether the scheme in question fulfilled the
requirements of any of the express exceptions of Article 58,328 or could
be justified by some "overriding requirements of the general
interest. 3 29 The Court found that the statute was not justified by any
overriding need in the general interest, since "general financial
interests of a Member State cannot constitute adequate
justification."33 Therefore, the scheme failed to meet the acceptable
justification condition.
The Court did not need to evaluate whether the measure was
proportionate and narrowly tailored to meet the objective, but briefly
discussed both legal certainty and proportionality.33" ' The Court was
not swayed by the argument that the "administrative decisions had to
be reasoned 3312 because knowledge of the criteria ex post facto failed
to meet the burden of legal certainty.333 As for the principle of
proportionality, the Court declared that a system of ex-post facto
declaration would have to be completely incapable of achieving the
objective in order for a system of prior authorization to ever be
acceptable.33 4
Portugal was the least complicated of the three golden share cases
The first law challenged was
decided on June 4, 2002.335
324. Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 44, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, %44.
325. Article 56 permits no restrictions on either capital or payment flows between
Member States and Member States and third parties. EC Treaty art. 56.
326. Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 45, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, 45.
327. See supra Part I.C.2.; see also Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94, & C-250/94,
Sanz de Lera, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4821, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631 (1995).
328. Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 49, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, 49.
329. Id.
330. Id. '52. A long line of cases establishes this concept. See Case C-54/99,
Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335,
17; Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et de
l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955, $1 13-14; Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister
35 (1984)
35, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544,
for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R. 2727,
(noting that safeguarding petroleum supplies is not a purely economic motive, and
can therefore be acceptable).
49-50, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
331. See Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
49-50.
48,
332. See Cdmara, supra note 12, at 508.
333. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (defining legal certainty).
334. See Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 50, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48,
50.
335. See Joined Cases C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2
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discriminatory on its face, and thus could only be allowed to stand
under extremely limited circumstances, none of which were presented

by the Portuguese.336 The second law, which applied to all persons

wanting to purchase shares with a voting weight of more than ten

percent, failed the first of the four necessary conditions,33 7 as the
338

objective could not justify a restriction of a fundamental freedom.

The harder questions, those relating to proportionality and necessity,
did not need to be addressed.
2. Commission v. France

The question of proportionality became the pivotal issue in the
second case decided by the Court on June 4, 2002. 339 At issue in the
Commission's case against France was the golden share which

reserved certain rights to the Minister of Economic Affairs. 340 Postprivatization legislation created a golden share in Soci&t Nationale
Elf-Aquitaine ("SNEA").
Specifically, the statute granted the
Minister the right to oppose company decisions regarding the disposal

of assets and to appoint two members to the board of directors. 3"
Even more troubling was the obligation imposed upon any investor
wishing to purchase more than a certain number of shares to obtain
prior approval of the Minister.3 42 It was this scheme of prior
authorization which was the focus of the Commission's case against

France.343 The Commission, as required by procedure, notified France
that it believed the requirement to be contrary to EC law. The
French, fearing foreign control over the petroleum supplies, were not
willing to forgo the golden share entirely."
The Court first assessed whether the golden share that France
reserved in SNEA posed a restriction on the movement of capital. 45

Like the Portuguese, the French argued that the measure was not
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), & C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 22.
336. See supra notes 82-85, 95-96, 108-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of
exceptions under which a restriction of the free movement of capital and freedom of
establishment may be imposed.
337. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
338. See generally Case C-367/98, Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
52, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48, 52 (asserting that Portugal's motive was purely economic, and thus did
not justify restricting capital movements).
339. See id. 53.
340. See id. 14.
341. Id. 9. It should be noted that the two members appointed by the Minister
did not have voting rights. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. T 21-24.
344. Id.
14-15 (stating that France would require pre-authorization only where
holdings in excess of the maximum share limits might threaten petroleum supplies
and that safeguarding such supplies was an important objective).
345. Id. T 38-43.
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contrary to Article 56 because it was non-discriminatory, 346 but again,
the Court found no merit in this argument. 347 Any measure which has
the potential to deter investment by nationals of other Member States
might make free movement of capital "illusory," and is thus contrary
to Community law.3 48 Therefore, for the French golden share to
comply with Article 56, it had to be justified either by an explicit
Treaty exception or by "overriding requirements of the general
interest. '349 Moreover, even if the objective justified the restriction,
the system of prior authorization must be the least restrictive means of
achieving that goal.35
The French, unlike the Portuguese, satisfied the first condition: In
1984, in Campus Oil, the Court had determined that
petroleum products.., are of fundamental importance for a
country's existence since not only its economy but above all its
institutions, its essential public services and even the survival of its
inhabitants depend upon them. An interruption of supplies of
petroleum products ... could therefore seriously affect the public
security.35
Thus the objective of safeguarding the nation's petroleum supplies is a
legitimate national interest,352 and can justify some restriction of
capital movements.3 53 The Commission itself conceded that the
objective might, under the right circumstances, merit a restriction.354
Accepting this,35 the Court examined the scope of the scheme
utilized.3 56 Because the use of the public security exception requires
that there be a "genuine and sufficiently serious threat, ' 3 7 a Member
State may adopt only those measures which are absolutely necessary
to secure against the threat.35 8 Finding that the French system of prior
authorization offered investors no "indication whatever as to the
specific, objective circumstances in which prior authorisation will be
346. Id. 39.
347. Id. 40.
348. Id. 41.
349. Id. 1 45; see also Case C-54/99, Association lglise de Scientologie de Paris v.
Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, IT 17-18.
350. See generally Association Aglise de Scientologie de Paris,2000 E.C.R. 1-1335,
20.
351. See Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R.
2727, 34, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984), 34. In Campus Oil, the Court scrutinized
Irish rules which were adopted to ensure that Ireland's only oil refinery was not
closed, which would have had the effect of making the nation entirely dependent
upon foreign oil supplies. In the wake of the energy crisis of the 1970s, the Irish
government was reluctant to allow that to happen. See id. 'll 5-7.
352. See id. 35.
353. Id.
354. Case C-483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, 1 26, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49, 26.
355. Id. 47.
356. See id. 147.
357. Id. 48.
358. See id. 49.
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granted or refused,"35' 9 the Court decided that the lack of transparency
and legal certainty provided too much discretionary power, and was
therefore not proportionate to the stated purpose.3 6 As with the
system of prior authorization that the Court denied in Eglise de
Scientologie,36 1 the French golden share system lacked the requisite
specificity and failed to adequately indicate to investors when prior
authorization would be granted or denied. As such, the restriction
violated Article 56 of the EC Treaty.
The most important aspect of France was the Court's
acknowledgment that some important national interests could
necessitate restricting the free movement of capital and the freedom
of establishment.3 62 Furthermore, the judgment made clear the
absolute importance of transparency and proportionality. Though this
is a high standard, the final judgment on golden shares handed down
on June 4, 2002 proved that it is not an impossible standard to meet.
3. Commission v. Belgium
The third, and arguably most important,363 case was that against
Belgium. At issue were two Royal Decrees, each of which vested a
golden share in the government.3 64 In the Royal Decree of June 10
1994, a golden share was granted in the Socijtg Nationale de Transport
par Canalisations ("SNTC").3 65 Another Royal Decree on June 16,
1994 vested in the state a golden share in Socidtg de Distribution du
Gaz SA ("Distrigaz").3 66 Both enterprises were involved in the gas
and energy distribution sector.3 67 The golden shares granted were
very similar, reserving to the state: (1) the right to be notified of any
transfer, sale, or use as collateral of the company's strategic assets, 368
and (2) the right to appoint two members to the board of directors
who could in turn suggest to the Minister responsible that he annul a
359. Id. 50.
360. See id. 50-51.
361. See Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime
Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, $$ 21-23.
362. Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, T$ 49-50, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), T149-50.
363. Because the Belgian case is the only one to date in which the Court permitted
the use of golden share measures, it is perhaps the most important because it leaves
open the possibility that governments may implement such measures in some
instances. Without this decision, the outlook for the future of golden shares would be
very dim. Additionally, the Belgian golden share can serve as a model for future
golden shares. Provided a government has an acceptable objective, it may avail itself
of the protections inherent in golden shares. See infra Part III.B.2.
364. Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
50 (2002), 1.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. 28.
368. Id. T 1.
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decision of the board, if he "consider[ed] that the operation in
question36 9 adversely affect[ed] the national interest in the energy
sector.
The structure of these rights, and how they were to be asserted, was
of particular consequence to the Court's evaluation. The government
officials who were appointed to the board of directors could, within
four business days, propose to the appropriate Minister that an action
of the board be annulled. 37 ° The proposal effected an immediate
suspension of the action in question.3 71 The Minister then had eight
business days to take action, and should he fail to annul the decision
in that time, the suspension would end, and the action would become
effective.372 However, there was a right of appeal to the Belgian
Conseil D'Etat to seek annulment of the Minister's decision.373
The Commission, relying on the 1997 Communication, argued that
such measures were a restriction of the free movement of capital and
the freedom of establishment, and could not co-exist with Community
law unless covered by one of the express exceptions.3 74 Belgium
contended that the measures were justified by reasons of public
security and overriding general national interest requirements.375
Moreover, like both France and Portugal, Belgium noted that the
schemes were non-discriminatory.376
Following the framework utilized in France and Portugal,the Court
recognized that restrictions on the free movement of capital are
clearly contrary to the EC Treaty, and justifiable only in narrowly
limited circumstances.3 77 The Court then commenced its four part
assessment of the system. The objective in question-safeguarding
energy supplies and protecting the national energy policy-satisfied
the first criterion.378
Like protection of petroleum supplies,37 9
'380
safeguarding energy supplies is a "legitimate public interest.
Having determined that the objective was legitimate and might permit
some restriction of capital movement, the Court considered whether

369. Id. $$ 1, 9.
370. Id.
371. Id. 9.
372. Id.
373. Id. 29.
374. Id. $$ 16-21.
375. Id. 26.
376. Id. 12.
377. Id. 45.
378. Id. 46.
379. See Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R.
2727, $ 34-35, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544, $$ 34-35 (1984) (recognizing that securing
petroleum supplies is of fundamental interest to the public security).
380. Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, %46, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 46.
The Court explicitly acknowledged that though Campus Oil was a free movement of
goods case, the "same reasoning applies to obstacles to the free movement of capital."
Id.
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the measure was structured
to meet the principle of proportionality
381
and legal certainty.
The Court noted three specific elements of the scheme which
ensured that it met the requirement of legal certainty. First, it was a
system of opposition, not of prior authorization.3 2 The investor need
not apply for permission; rather, the onus was on the government to
object to an action which it believed posed a threat to national
security. 383 Second, the government could only object where the
action considered by the board related to certain specific assets, such
as altering the energy supply networks. 3 4 Third, the Minister was only
permitted to intercede when the government's energy policy
objectives were jeopardized by the proposed action. 8
These
limitations created the legal certainty necessary to permit a restriction
on a fundamental freedom.3 86 A final critical element was the
availability of judicial review.3" The Belgian golden shares, therefore,
satisfied the principle of proportionality and were a permissible
restriction on the free movement of capital and the freedom of
establishment.388
All four conditions were met, and though the Court did not
explicitly apply the four-part test to the facts, it is clear that it
considered them all: the scheme was not discriminatory,3 89 and it was
justified by an overriding need in the general interest,390 which had
previously been identified by the Court in Campus Oil;39 ' the scheme
could effectively achieve the objective,3" and Belgium had
demonstrated that the measure was narrowly tailored to achieve the
objective without excessive restriction.393 The standard, therefore, is
not impossible to meet.

381. Id. 48.
382. See id. 49.
383. See id. IT 47-49.
384. See id. 50.
385. See id. 51.
386. See id. 52.
387. See id.
51. The availability of judicial review of the Minister's decision
ensured the necessary predictability needed to create legal certainty. See id. 52.
388. See id. IT 57, 60.
389. See id. I 9-10 (outlining the laws in question, which were applicable to all
persons, regardless of nationality).
390. See id. 46.
391. See Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R.
2727, 35, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984), 35.
392. See Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809,
45-52, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
50,
45-52.
393. See id. 53. ("The Commission has not shown that less restrictive measures
could have been taken to attain the objective pursued.").

2004]

THE ECJ'S GOLDEN SHARE DECISIONS

2265

C. The 2003 Cases
In May 2003, the Court handed down two more golden share
decisions, one against Spain and the other against the U.K.394 Not
surprisingly, the Court analyzed the laws at issue in these cases using
the same formulaic approach as it had in the 2002 cases, focusing on
the Article 56 violation and only minimally addressing the Article 43
infringements. 39'
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer again
rendered a prior opinion, 96 arguing that there were some deficiencies
in the Court's analysis of the original golden share cases, particularly
that against Belgium as compared to its analysis in the case against
France. 397 The Advocate General's opinion determined that in light of
those decisions, the case against Spain should be dismissed,398 while
the Court should find the U.K. scheme unacceptably restrictive. 399 As
with the original golden share cases, and contrary to the Court's
frequent practice of adopting the opinion of the A.G.,4° the Court did
not follow his opinion.
1. Commission v. Spain
Spanish Law No. 5/1995 provided the structure for privatization and
the retention of certain powers by the State. 401 Specifically, the law
394. Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, [20031 2 C.M.L.R. 18
(2003); Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 19 (2003).
395. See Case C-98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641,
52, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 19, 52.
[I]t is appropriate to point out that in so far as the rules in question entail
restrictions on freedom of establishment, such restrictions are a direct
consequence of the obstacles to the free movement of capital... to which
they are inextricably linked. Consequently, since an infringement of Article
56 EC has been established, there is no need for a separate examination of
the measures at issue in the light of the Treaty rules concerning freedom of
establishment.
Id.; Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581,
86, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18,
86
(repeating almost verbatim its consideration of the issue in the case against the U.K.).
396. The Advocate General's analysis was again very well-formulated and seemed
to deal with the issues in a more logical manner, and will be discussed in greater detail
below. See infra Part II.D.
397. Joined Cases C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -,
[2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), & Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R.
-,
[2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, I 38-40.
398. Id. 46.
399. Id. 58. A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer noted that with minor changes, the
provisions in place in the U.K. could be brought into line with the Treaty and
therefore be legal. Specifically, he noted that reasoned opinions by the government
for its use of the golden share powers, and the availability of judicial review, were
needed to bring these provisions into conformity. Id.
400. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 62 (noting that the Court "often...
reach[es] the same conclusion, though perhaps on different grounds").
401. Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581,
9 [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), 9.
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applied to any undertaking in which the State owned greater than

twenty-five percent,4 °2 and which was involved in "essential services or
public services,""' 3 activities subject to administrative review due to
public interest,4" and those actions which were exempt from EU laws

governing competition.

5

The law set up a system of prior

authorization for certain company decisions,"' as well as for any

reduction in the State-owned shares of ten percent or greater, or the
acquisition of shares by an investor which "results in a holding of at
least ten percent of the share capital."4 7 The framework was
executed by individual Royal Decrees regarding various undertakings.
The sectors involved included petroleum,
telecommunications,
40 8
tobacco, commercial banking, and electricity.
As with the cases against France, Belgium, and Portugal, the

Commission argued that any system of prior authorization was per se

restrictive of capital movements. 9
Moreover, the Court had
41
addressed this exact form of restriction in tglise de Scientologie 1

holding that a system "which makes a direct foreign investment
subject to prior authorization constitutes a restriction on the

'
movement of capital."411
The Commission conceded that there may
be instances where such restrictions could be applied, but based on
clear case law, these are narrowly defined exceptions, and in all
circumstances, the principles of legal certainty and proportionality

must be met.412 Furthermore, it is absolutely clear that
such
413
restrictions can never be applied for purely economic motives.

It is here that the Commission had its strongest argument. While it
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. Article 90 governs competition. See EC Treaty art. 86 (previously art. 90).
406. Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, T 9. The
company decisions in question related to mergers, de-mergers, disposal of key assets,
or alteration of the company purpose.
407. Id.
408. Id. 1 11.
409. Id. 31.
410. Case C-54/99, Association tglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister,
2000 E.C.R. 1-1335.
411. Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, $133, [20031 2 C.M.L.R. 18, 1 33
(citing Case C-54/99, Eglise de Scientologie, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, 9114).
412. Id. 9134 (citing Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1993 E.C.R.
1-1663; Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995)). These two cases
outline the four conditions necessary for the imposition of a restriction of a
fundamental freedom. See Case C-55/94 Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 9 39, [1996] 1
C.M.L.R. 603, 9 39; see also Case C-12/92, Kraus, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, [1 37-41.
413. Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, T 35, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, 9 35; see
also Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 91 52, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), 9 52 ("[T]he general financial interests of a Member State cannot
constitute adequate justification. It is settled case-law that economic grounds can
never serve as justification for obstacles prohibited by the Treaty.").
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is true that protecting petroleum was an overriding public interest
worthy of restricting the free movement of capital and the freedom of
establishment," 4 and it is possible that electricity, like energy"' and
petroleum, 4 6 could also be considered fundamental to the national
interest, the Commission would not accept the protection of a tobacco
company as such. 17
Nor would the Commission recognize the
commercial banking activity as an overriding interest worthy of an
exception to the prohibition on restrictions.4 8 Although the measures
in place for the petroleum, telecommunications, and electricity
companies arguably met the first requirement-that the objective
must be valid-the Commission absolutely rejected the system of
prior authorization, 419 because it failed both the legal certainty and
proportionality tests.42 °
Spain contended that since one of the laws stated that the system of
prior approval established by Royal Decree No. 5/1995 was meant to
be applied "consistently with the provisions of the Treaty...
concerning the right of establishment and the free movement of
capital, ' 42 1 it did not violate the Treaty. Spain also adopted A.G.
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's argument in the original golden share cases:
The Treaty expressly states that it "'shall in no way prejudice the rules
' 422
in Member States governing the system of property ownership, '
and therefore the system did not violate the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the Treaty.42 3
Notably, Spain argued in the alternative that there was no
restriction on the free movement of capital, but conceded that it was
possible that the system might affect the freedom of establishment.4 24
Nonetheless, Spain contended that "overriding requirements of the
general interest"4 5 and the necessity of protecting the "continuity in

414. See Case C-483/99, Commission v. France., 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, 47, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), 47; Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd., 1984 E.C.R. 2727, 35, [1984]
3 C.M.L.R. 544, 35.
415. Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, $ 46, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 50 (2002), $ 46.
416. See 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R. 2727,
35, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984), 35.
417. Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, $ 35, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, $ 35.
418. Id.
419. Id. 36.
420. Id.
421. Id. 40.
422. Joined Cases C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. -,
[2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. -,
[2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), & C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -,
[2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 40 (citing EC Treaty
art. 295).
423. Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, 41, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, 41.
424. Id. 1 43.
425. Id. 44.
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public services ' ' 1 26 justified the system.427

But the Court did not
respond to that argument, and instead analyzed the case in exactly the
same manner it had in the three original golden share cases. It based
the decision on the Spanish law's restriction of the free movement of

capital, and left unexplored the examination of the freedom of

establishment violation.42 8
The Court agreed with the Commission regarding the golden share

rights reserved in the tobacco and banking companies,429 finding that
these industries were not acceptable fields for recognition of an
imperative interest justifying a restriction of the free movement of
capital. 430 The bank in question was not involved in setting or
implementing national policy, nor EU policy, but only in commercial
activity.431 Commercial banking cannot be considered a sector whose

protection constitutes an overriding national interest justifying a
restriction on capital flows or the right of establishment.432 At best, it
is in the general financial interest of the country, and, as the Court
decisively concluded in Portugal, such interests do not permit
restricting a fundamental freedom. 433 The Court found that the other
three undertakings were active in sectors which could, under some
circumstances, validate the need to restrict capital flows. 43 4 However,

the Court again agreed with the Commission's argument and found
that the measures failed to meet the requirement of legal certainty, as
no precise or objective criteria were provided to indicate to the
potential investor when such a request for approval would be
granted.435 The scheme allowed for too much discretion "which

426. Id.
427. Id.
428. See id.
85-86:
In that regard, it is appropriate to point out that in so far as the legislation in
issue entails restrictions on freedom of establishment, such restrictions are a
direct consequence of the obstacles to the free movement of capital ...to
which they are inextricably linked. Consequently, since an infringement of
Art. 56 EC has been established, there is no need for a separate examination
of the measures at issue in the light of the Treaty rules concerning freedom
of establishment.
Id. 86.
429. See id. % 70.
430. See id. (noting that, though the Spanish government argued that "the regime
at issue is justified by overriding requirements of the general interest linked to
strategic imperatives," Spain failed to establish that the bank had a "public service
function.").
431. See id.
432. See id.
433. See, e.g., Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
52,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002),
52 ("[T]he general financial interests of a Member
State cannot constitute adequate justification.").
434. See Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, 71, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, 71.
435. See id. 74.
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represent[ed] a serious threat to the free movement of capital and
[might] end by negating it completely. 4 36

A comparison of the Spanish system in question and the one
implemented by Belgium makes clear that the Spanish scheme was
not as narrowly tailored and limited as the Belgian system that the
Court upheld.437 A notable difference was the Spanish system's lack
of judicial review of a denial of prior authorization. 43 8 Had the

Spanish scheme met the precision and proportionality requirement,
this decision could have been split: The restrictions would not have

been acceptable for two industries (tobacco and commercial banking),
but would likely have been acceptable restrictions for the other three,

as they related to imperative general interests (electricity, petroleum,
and telecommunications).
4 39
2. Commission v. United Kingdom

Another golden share case, this time against the United Kingdom,
was also decided on May 13, 2003. 44 The U.K. did not argue that the

company involved, the British Airport Authority ("BAA"),

1

was

or public policy. 442
vital to the general interest, public security
3
Instead, the U.K. relied on company law."1

436. See id. 76.
437. See id. $$ 77-78.
438. See id. 78.
439. Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 19 (2003). The EU does not have a unified Company law, but rather each
Member State governs its own corporate law.
Member States are entitled to engage in economic activities on the same
basis as private market operators, within the framework of contracts
governed by private law. In the absence of harmonisation of the rules of
national company law, Community law cannot impose on a company which
issues shares the obligation to place the control of that company on the
market, or to attach to its shares the whole range of rights which all actual
and potential investors might wish to see attached to them.
Id. 31.
440. Case C-98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641, [20031 2 C.M.L.R. 19.
441. Id. 8.
442. It is possible that they may have succeeded had they pursued such a line of
argument. Since the specific company in question was the BAA, even disregarding
the events of September 11, 2001, a solid argument can be made for the importance of
safeguarding a nation's airports as an overriding national interest. In light of the
terrorist attacks which were launched from airports, a strong argument for a public
security exception also exists. The Court might find that a less restrictive means exists
to guard the nation's airports. But, since the Court recognized that restricting foreign
property ownership on certain parts of the Italian coast might be a valid objective for
a restriction based on national security (if the protective measure was proportionate
and not overly burdensome), it is likely that the Court would at least consider a public
security argument for airports. However, whether or not protection of the airports
would be considered fundamental to the interests of the nation is left open for the
future, since the U.K. did not argue that it was. See id. 49.
443. See id. 24.
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The Airports Act of 1986 privatized the British airport industry.""
The Act created a one pound golden share in the BAA, which was
established to manage the United Kingdom's airports." 5
The
Secretary of Transportation held the share which conferred the right

to give written consent regarding the disposal or change in control of
certain BAA assets." 6 These rights were included in Article 10 of the
BAA's Articles of Association. 4 7 Article 40 of the Articles of
Association limited the percentage of shares that could be owned by
any one person." 8 Only "[p]ermitted" persons were allowed to
individually hold more than fifteen percent of the voting stock." 9 The
U.K. defended the golden share, claiming that share structures are
governed by company law, which is a national concern.
Moreover,
the U.K. argued that since the golden share did not prevent access to
the market for the BAA shares, it was not contrary to Community
45
law.

1

The Commission attacked the golden share on two grounds: first, it
limited the potential to acquire voting shares; second, the Commission
objected to the system of pre-approval in place for decisions relating
to the disposal of assets, loss of control over subsidiaries, and the
winding up of the company.542 Such measures might hinder freedom
of establishment and also hamper the free movement of capital. 53
Because the U.K. did not argue that the objective was justifiable for
reasons of public security, public policy or an overriding reason of the
general interest, 5" and because the golden share seriously limited the
right of investors to manage the company without first obtaining
approval from the Secretary of Transportation, the Commission
argued that the measure was a restriction on the two freedoms. 55 The
Commission discounted the company law argument because the rights
under discussion did "not arise from the normal operation of that
law" 56 and were created only through an act of state. 57

444. See id. 8.
445. See id.
446. See id. % 10. Specifically, the Secretary of Transportation had to be conferred
with prior to (1) the BAA ceasing to hold controlling shares in any of the designated
airports; (2) the dissolution of the BAA or of any of its subsidiaries which own a
designated airport, unless in so doing the designated airport is still owned by the BAA
or another subsidiary; and (3) the disposal of any designated airport. See id.
447. See id.
448. See id. 11.
449. See id.
450. See id. 16.
451. See id.
452. See id. 19.
453. See id. 20.
454. See id. 22.
455. See id. 23.
456. See id. 24.
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Again refusing to investigate the possible Article 43
infringements,4 58 the Court built upon previous free movement of
capital case law and evaluated the compatibility of the U.K. golden
share with Treaty rights. Finding that measures which limit the
"scope for participating effectively in management '459 restrict the free
movement of capital, the Court established that the cap on the
amount of voting stock an investor may own was a violation of Article
56 .46
Deterring investment is an indirect restriction to market
access.461 Therefore it could not be tolerated, unless justified by a
Treaty exception or an imperative reason of national interest. 462 None
being offered, the Court confined itself to the questions presented,
and agreed with the Commission that the U.K. rule did not fall within
the normal operation of company law, and therefore was not excluded
from compliance with Article 56.463
D. Advocate GeneralRuiz-Jarabo Colomer's Opinion
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer rendered opinions in both
the 2002 golden share cases and the 2003 golden share cases.4 " In
457. See id. Since Parliament had to act to insert this special share in the Articles
of Association, the Commission refused to recognize this as a normal operation of the
U.K. Company law. Id.
458. See id.
51-52. Again the Court held that any infringement of Article 43 is a
"direct consequence" of the restriction of the free movement of capital, and need not
be examined independently. Id.
459. See id. 44; see also Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp.,
ex parte Factortame Ltd., 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905, $$ 20-23 (coming to the same
conclusion vis-a-vis the right of establishment by finding that a British condition that
the owner of a ship be British in order to register it infringes upon the right of
establishment since "where the vessel constitutes an instrument for pursuing an
economic activity which involves a fixed establishment in the Member State
concerned, the registration of that vessel cannot be disassociated from the exercise of
the freedom of establishment.").
460. See Case C-98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641,
44, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 19, 1 44.
461. See id. T 47. The Court has found such deterrence effectively deprives persons
of their Treaty rights. See Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli
Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, T 37, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603
(1995), 37 ("[N]ational measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise
of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions."
(emphasis added)); cf. Case C-222/97, Trummer & Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1661,
26,
[2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1143 (1999),
26 (holding that a rule which might dissuade a
homebuyer from denominating his mortgage in another Member State's currency
deprives them of the right to free movement of capital).
462. E.g., Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, 45, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), 45.
463. See Case C-98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641, $$ 48-49, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 19,
48-49.
464. Joined Cases C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), & C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. __,
[2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer; Joined Cases C367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. -_,[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002); C483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002); & C-

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

2272

[Vol. 72

both instances, the Court declined to adopt his opinion.465 In the 2002

cases, the Advocate General opined that, with one exception,466 the
various powers reserved by the states in the form of the golden shares
were completely consistent with Treaty obligations.4 67 Article 295
states, simply and unequivocally: "This Treaty shall in no way
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of
property ownership. ' 468 Determining that the Treaty intended that

property ownership must "extend to any measure which, through
intervention in the public sector, understood in the economic sense,
allows the State to contribute to the organisation of the nation's
financial activity, 4 69

A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer argued that any

interpretation of property law so narrowly limited to apply to purely

private or civil law was "absurd.1 470 Furthermore, Article 295 is
placed in part six of the Treaty-General and Final Provisions-thus
he reasoned that Article 295 must apply to all preceding Treaty
provisions. 471 Furthermore, he utilized an historical approach to

interpreting the import of the article, and noted that Article 295 traces

its authority to the initial agreements. 472 Based on the wording of the

first version of this Article, "[t]his Treaty shall in no way prejudice the
system of ownership of means of production which exists within the
Community,

'473

it would be logical to conclude that a state may have a

property right in "exercis[ing] decisive influence on the definition
and
474
implementation of all or some of its economic objectives.
503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002),
Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
465. See supra notes 289-92,396-400 and accompanying text.
466. The exception was the discriminatory law in place in Portugal, which is
discussed supra Part II.B.1. See Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. __,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, C-483/99, France,2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48; & C503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer, $ 29-30.
467. Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. _, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, C483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, & C-503/99, Belgium, 2002
E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 92.
468. EC Treaty art. 295; see also Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. __,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, C-483/99, France,2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, & C503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. _, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer, 40.
469. Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal, [2002] E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, C483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R.
, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, & C-503/99, Belgium, 2002
56.
, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,
E.C.R.
470. See id. 63.
471. Id. $ 43.
472. Id. 45 ("Article 295 EC is in the unique position of deriving its authority
directly from the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, on which it has been based,
which reinforces its specific nature and symbolic importance.").
473. Id. 51 (referring to the wording of the original draft of 5 December 1956).
474. Id. 54. However, the reasoning utilized by A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer fails
to fully explain why a state would not simply retain a majority holding in those
companies which it believes to be critical to the interests of the nation, and thereby
retain the ability to direct the company. For a discussion of some perceived
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A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's reasoning in the 2003 cases is arguably
the most persuasive of all the analysis available on the compatibility of
golden shares with Community law. Additionally, A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer exposed some deficiencies in the Court's analysis of the 2002
golden share cases. First, the A.G. asserted that the freedom of
establishment represents a more suitable framework than that of the
free movement of capital for an analysis of restrictions arising from
state-held golden shares.4 75 The states were attempting to influence
control of privatized companies, not the movement of capital into the
nation.47 6 As such, the measures only affect capital movements
indirectly. 477 Like Luisi & Carbone, where capital movements were

only a necessary by-product of the free movement of services,

8

here,

the movement of capital was incidental to the exercise of the right of
establishment. Because the freedom of establishment is directly

infringed, and the free movement of capital only incidentally, the
appropriate inquiry was how the various golden share mechanisms
infringed freedom of establishment.4 79
Furthermore, A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer contended that there
were some deficiencies in the Court's 2002 golden share decisions.480
Leaving aside the judgment against Portugal, which was
clear, he then
481 In Belgium, 482
compared the French regime with that of Belgium.
the Court made much of the legal certainty of the system in place: the
governmental representative on the board had only four days in which
weaknesses of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's opinion, see Kronenberger, supra note
13, at 125-27.
475. See Joined Cases C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. _, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), & C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R.
[2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 36.
476. See id. 36; see also Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, 39, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18, $ 39 (noting that government approval allows the government to ensure
that "the specific responsibilities" of the privatized undertakings are met); Case C483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781,
28, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49, $ 28 (noting that
ensuring that the decision-making body remain in France is essential to the protection
of the energy supplies); Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, $$ 31-32, [2002]
2 C.M.L.R. 48, $$ 31-32 (arguing that the Portuguese government must have the
requisite level of control to ensure that the re-privatization goals are not frustrated);
Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, 28, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 128 (noting
that the government needs the means to protect the energy policy from being
negatively affected by company decisions).
477. See Joined Cases C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & C98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. -, [20031 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G. RuizJarabo Colomer, 36.
478. See Case C-286/82, Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R. 377,
22, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52 (1984), $ 22.
479. See Joined Cases C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & C98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. _, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G. RuizJarabo Colomer, $ 36.
480. See id. $$ 36-37.
481. Id. $$ 38-40.
482. Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
50 (2002).
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to object, and the Minister then had twenty-one days to overturn the
board's decision .4" A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer noted, however, that
the French measure was also subject to strict time limits-the French
minister had one month in which to deny authorization.84 That was
only minimally longer than the time period which the Court allowed
in Belgium.4 s5
Moreover, the A.G. noted the lack of specificity in the Belgian
system; the government representative could object to any proposed
action which he deemed contrary to national energy policy.4" 6 The
Court found this to be an "objective criteria ' 487 sufficiently clear to
guarantee legal certainty. However, the A.G. did not believe this to
be so much more clear or precise than the French system of
opposition to any transfer or disposal of an asset identified in an
annex to the decree in question.488 The French law also indicated that
authorization would be denied in order to protect the national
interest,489 but the Court was not satisfied that this offered the same
level of protection as the Belgian law, which specifically stated that
490
the Minister was concerned with the national energy policy.
Apparently, this incremental amount of added specificity was enough.
Though the Court methodically evaluated each of the golden share
cases in the same manner, it remains unclear what is actually required
to meet the principle of legal certainty; indeed, it is much easier to
determine what fails to meet the test.

483. See Joined Cases C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & C98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. -, [20031 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G. RuizJarabo Colomer, $ 39; see also Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809,
49,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 1 49.
484. See id. $ 39. However, the French Minister was able to extend this time limit
by a further fifteen days. See id.
485. See Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, $ 22, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50,
29. In Belgium, the Court found twenty-one days to be an acceptable time frame for
the Minister to act, whereas in the French regulation, the government had one month.
Id. 49.
486. See Joined Cases C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -,
[2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & C98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G. RuizJarabo Colomer,
38; see also Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809,
9,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 9.
487. Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, $ 52, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 52.
488. See Joined Cases C-463100, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. ___ [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & C98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. _, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G. RuizJarabo Colomer, 38.
489. See Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, $ 50, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 49, 50 (2002).
490. Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809,
9, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 9.
However, Fleisher finds that the two modes of control are in fact different in a very
important manner. According to Fleisher, the Belgian system restricted the
management of the company, whereas the French system restricted the access to the
company. See Fleisher, supra note 19, at 495. Such a distinction would seem to
reconcile the two decisions, but this distinction is not readily apparent in the
decisions, and the wording of the two systems is not so very different.
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III. WHAT LIES AHEAD

This part considers the future import of the golden share rulings.
Part III.A. identifies some recently commenced actions. Part III.B.
discusses the reaction by Member States, as well as both acceding and

applicant states, to the judgments. Finally, Part III.C. looks at the
broader role of the rulings within the context of the EU as an

institution.
The first golden share cases provide the framework for scrutinizing

future use and structure of golden share devices, but the fact-intensive
inquiry necessary to determine which derogations are compatible with

the Treaty49 ensures that these six cases are just a starting point.
Specifically, Portugal mandates that something more than an

economic or commercial objective is needed to justify restricting

capital flows,492 and France and Belgium are pivotal for defining the
scope of the proportionality requirement.4 93 The Belgian case ensures
that some golden shares comply with Community law,494 which is
precisely why the ECJ will hear more golden share cases. Spain and
United Kingdom illustrate the Court's application of the framework.4 95

Based on the Court's decisions and the arguments of the

Commission,4 96 one would expect that the existence of these golden
shares has had a great impact on investment in the EU. But the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (the
"OECD") concluded that barriers to inward foreign investment are

lower in EU Member States than in any other industrialized nation.497
The purpose of Article 56 and the free movement of capital is to

ensure that cross-border investment and capital flows are not

inhibited, 498 and it would seem that the existence of golden shares has
491. See supra Part II.
492. See Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 52, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), 9152; Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v.
Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, 17.
493. The French law was not as detailed as the Belgian Decrees, and failed to
provide the "objective and stable criteria" ultimately required for a golden share right
to be compatible with Community law. See Communication, supra note 20,
9.
Belgium threw a lifeline to the battered golden share, though, and ensured that these
special rights did not yet face extinction. See Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I4809, %55, [20021 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 9155 (permitting the use of the Belgian golden share
because it met the four-prong test).
494. See supra notes 377-93 and accompanying text.
495. See supra Part II.C.
496. See supra Part II.
497. In a worldwide review of investment movement, the OECD concluded that
the EU Member States have "the lowest barriers in the industrialised world to inward
foreign direct investment." Guy de Jonquieres, Europe Leads Way in Lack of Barriers
to Foreign Investment, Fin. Times, May 23, 2003, at 9. Of course, the results of the
OECD review are not adjusted to reflect the existence of restrictive measures, and it
is very likely that the results tell more about the existence and effectiveness of
restrictions elsewhere.
498. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions to the
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not completely dissuaded investment movement. But Article 56 is
unequivocal, 499 and the Commission will certainly not give up the fight

to free the EU from all unnecessary restrictions.
A. Pending Action

The Commission is seriously contemplating taking action against
Germany for what it views as excessive state control over
Volkswagen. 00 The German state of Lower Saxony retains an
unusually high degree of control over Volkswagen. 50 1 Germany has
argued that the Volkswagen law (the "VW law") is simply the
German version of a golden share, and thus should not be attacked as
incompatible with Treaty obligations.502 Now that the Court has
spoken so decisively on golden shares,0 3 this argument is less likely to

prevail.
On March 19, 2003, the Commission sent Germany notice that, in
its view, this law was contrary to the free movement of capital and the

free movement of capital which are detailed in Article 58).
499. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
500. See, e.g., Aude Genet, EU Launches Action Against "Volkswagen Law," EU
Bus., Mar. 19, 2003, at http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2003/03/l05947/view.
501. A strict limitation on voting rights prevents any shareholder from exercising
more than twenty percent of the voting stock, regardless of how much stock they
actually own. See Breffni O'Rourke, Big Business in Europe-Global Outlook
Limited for
Vivendi,
Volkswagen,
EU
Bus.,
July
10,
2002,
at
http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2002/07/85779/view;
EU Launches Action
Against German Law Protecting VW Against Takeovers, EU Bus., Mar. 19, 2003, at
http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2003/03/105935/view. This guarantees the state
of Lower Saxony at least operational control of the company, despite state ownership
of only eighteen and a half percent of the company. EU Delays Decision on
Germany's Volkswagen Law by Two Weeks, EU Bus., Mar. 5, 2003, at
http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2003/03/104811/view. Additionally, this control
is further strengthened by the State's ability to name approximately half of the
shareholder representatives to the supervisory board. EU Launches Action Against
German Law Protecting VW Against Takeovers, EU Bus., Mar. 19, 2003, at
http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2003/03/105935/view; see also Genet, supra note
500. Furthermore, for certain decisions, a majority vote of greater than eighty percent
is required. See Press Release, European Commission, Free Movement of Capital:
Commission Asks Germany to Justify Its Volkswagen Law (Mar. 19, 2003), available
at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh
[hereinafter March Press
Release]. Though Volkswagen is publicly traded on exchanges throughout Europe,
New
York,
and
Japan,
see
http://www2.volkswagenir.de/index.php@id=392&type=2.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004), and is widely held
stock, the voting cap is a potential hindrance of capital movements, and as the Court
specifically stated in Trummer & Mayer, direct evidence of a restriction is not
necessary for a measure to infringe upon a fundamental freedom. Case C-222/97,
Trummer & Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1661, 1$ 26-28, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1143 (1999), $1
26-28 (holding that measures which may dissuade investment, even if they do not
prohibit or directly restrict it, violate Article 56 EC).
502. See Equalising Shares-Governments Must Let Go of Privatised Companies,
Fin. Times, May 14, 2003, at 22.
503. See supra Part II.
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Germany continues to aggressively

defend the VW law.505 If the case goes to the ECJ, it is likely that the

German law will be put to the same four-part test used in the golden

share cases,50 6 even though the VW law is not structured as a

traditional golden share. 57 Like the Spanish protection of the banking
and tobacco industries, it is unlikely that protecting a car
manufacturer would be considered an imperative interest in the
national interest, or acceptable for public policy or public security
reasons.0 ' Like Portugal and Spain, Germany's objective does not
satisfy the Treaty requirements and does not merit derogation.50 9 In

the unlikely event that Germany is able to convince the Court that
there is an acceptable imperative need in the general interest for the
protection of Volkswagen, the measure would still be required to
fulfill the principles of legal certainty and proportionality. 10

The Commission has taken the first steps to bring proceedings
against the Netherlands, Italy, Luxemburg, and Denmark for use of
golden shares.511 The Netherlands holds a golden share in KPN, a

formerly state-owned telecommunications giant. 12 Despite the
Commission's stance, the Netherlands has indicated that it has no

504. Id. Germany was given eight weeks in which to justify these provisions, and if
it failed to do so, the Commission could issue a "reasoned opinion" and move on
toward litigation. See James Durance, Germany-East German Strike Pain Increases,
ForcingAutomakers to Revise Production Schedules, WMRC Daily Analysis, June 23,
2003, available at 2003 WL 56932252. It appears likely that such an opinion will be
sent, since Germany staunchly defended this law as consistent with EU law
throughout the two month period granted to it to justify the law. See id.; Haig
Simonian & Francesca Guerrera, Germany Resists EU Attempt to Outlaw VW
Takeover Protection, Fin. Times, June 21, 2003, at 9. Since the law effectively does the
same thing as a golden share, it clearly restricts the movement of capital.
505. Germany contends that the law is justified. See Renee Cordes, VW Back in
EU Headlights, Daily Deal, Jan. 16, 2004, available at 2004 WL 64605306.
Furthermore, the company is currently not doing very well financially, and there is
some fear of a takeover which would could result in many job cuts. See id.
506. See supra Part I.B.
507. See Cordes, supra note 505.
508. See supra notes 429-32 and accompanying text.
509. It is likely that the Court would view this as protection of an economic
interest, and as such, impermissible. See supra note 330 and accompanying text; see
also Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, $ 35, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R.
18 (2003),
35; Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
52,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), 52.
510. See supra Part I.B.2-3.
511. See Vincent Brophy, End of the Golden Age, Legal Wk., June 19, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 8422786; Julian Ellison & Duncan Reed, Getting Tough on
Golden Shares, Fin. Times (FT.Com), June 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL 57800177;
Ruling Paves the Way For Pan-EuropeanInvestment, Irish Times, May 17, 2003, at 18,
available at 2003 WL 20053490; see also Paul Meller, EU Sues Over Dutch 'Golden
Shares,' Int'l Herald Trib., Dec. 18, 2003, at 12, availableat 2003 WL 64834347.
512. See Press Release, Commission of the European Union, Free Movement Of
Capital: Commission Takes the Netherlands to Court of Justice on Special Powers in
KPN
and
TNT
(Dec.
17,
2003),
at
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh.
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plans to relinquish its golden share in KPN.5 13 Italy is resisting
pressure by the Commission to relinquish a golden share in Telecom
Italia.514 In both cases, the ECJ could find that at least the first prong
of the test has been met.515
The Commission has also issued warnings to Italy and Spain
regarding laws in both nations which are designed to protect their
energy companies.5 16 Both regimes were put in place to protect
against acquisition by Itlectricit6 de France.5 17
All of this activity ensures that there will be more golden share

cases in the future. The Court in Spain stated that protection of the
telecom industry might, under the right circumstances, fall under the
public security exception." 8 The Court also held in Belgium that the

energy sector can justify a restriction of the free movement of capital

and the freedom of establishment.5 19 Therefore, any future inquiry by

the Court will focus on whether the laws imposed satisfy the principles
of proportionality and legal certainty-at least in regard to Telecom
Italia, Eni SPA, Enel, KPN and Endesa.
B. Reaction to the Decisions

1. Member States
Reaction by the Member States to the rulings in the golden share
cases has been mixed."' Popular opinion does not completely support
513. See Meller, supra note 511.
514. Fred Kapner, Italia Chief Still in Control, Fin. Times (London), July 20, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 57801986. The golden share permits the state to veto the
acquisition of more than three percent of the company by an individual investor. Id.
515. Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581,
71, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), 71.
As regards the three other undertakings concerned, which are active in the
petroleum, telecommunications and electricity sectors, it is undeniable that
the objective of safeguarding supplies of such products or the provision of
such services within the Member State concerned in the event of a crisis may
constitute a public-security reason and therefore may justify an obstacle to
the free movement of capital
Id. (emphasis added).
516. See Orange, supra note 26; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
517. See Orange, supra note 26.
518. See supra note 515.
519. See Case 503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, 1 46, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 50, 46 (2002).
520. France repealed its golden share in Elf-Aquitaine on October 3, 2002. See
Press Release, Commission of the European Union, Free Movement Of Capital:
Commission Calls On Portugal to Apply a Ruling of the Court Of Justice;
Proceedings Against France Are Closed (May 15, 2003), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh [hereinafter May Press Release].
The French repealed the golden share through Decree No. 2002-1231.
The
Commission officially declared the case closed on May 15, 2003. Id. A year after the
Court ruled in the 2002 cases, the case against France was officially closed, and the
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the decisions,5 21 and both Portugal and Spain have expressed
reluctance to comply with the rulings.522 But the Commission is not
Commission declared France compliant. See id. In May 2003, the Commission stated
that Portugal had failed to provide evidence that they have eliminated the restrictions.
Id. The U.K. quickly indicated that it would comply with the Court's ruling. See
Kevin Done, Government Loses BAA Golden Share, Fin. Times, Sept. 17, 2003, at 26.
Done also noted that the BAA is going beyond this and also plans to remove the
condition in its articles of association which limits voting rights of individual investors
to fifteen percent. Id.; see also Sean O'Grady, So Called Golden Shares Are the Base
Metal of Nationalism, The Independent, May 17, 2003, at 7, available at 2003 WL
20379256. However, the U.K. still holds golden shares in a number of companies,
including BAE Systems, British Energy and Rolls-Royce, among others. BAA
'Golden
Share'
Ruled
Illegal, BBC
News,
May
13,
2003,
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/3022809.stm; see also Ellison & Reed, supra note
511 (noting that the government in the U.K. still has golden shares in more than
twenty companies, and it is unlikely the Commission will stop with the BAA golden
share). Spain, on the other hand, has stated that it will not give up its golden shares in
Indra (defense and electronics), Telefonica (telecommunications), Repsol (oil), or
Endesa (power). Spain fears that "shortcomings of EU legislation in this area [will]
return the Spanish economy to a situation in which companies controlled by the state
have stakes in deregulated industries." Spain Remains Defiant over 'Golden Share'
(La Accion De Oro Solo Vetara A Empresas De CapitalPublico), Expansion, July 8,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Expansion File. However, there is some
likelihood that Spain will try to revise its golden share to fit into the Belgian model.
See Commission Sends Assent Against "Anti-EDF"Laws in Spain and Italy, Agence
Europe, July 10, 2003, availableat 2003 WL 58351621.
521. Some fear that the European Union is not really working to the best interests
of all the member states. See Graham Booth, Letter to the Editor, EU Meddling
Threatens Our Airports, W. Morning News, Sept. 30, 2003, at 4, available at 2003 WL
64568724. Mr. Booth expressed frustration with the appearance that the EU
manipulates the rules to the benefit of certain key cities, specifically Paris and
Frankfurt. Id. Mr. Booth's anger has some basis, at least on a superficial level, given
the recent concern over France and Germany's blatant disregard for the requirements
of the Stability and Growth Pact, and their subsequent ability to persuade the EU
Finance Ministers not to recommend they be forced to pay fines that would likely be
imposed on smaller EU nations which do not constitute such a large percentage of the
overall EU economy. See Ernst Welteke, The Pact's Principles Must Always Be
Protected, Fin. Times, Dec. 4, 2003, at 15 (discussing the damage to the "European
idea" caused by not penalizing Germany and France). Interestingly, the Commission
is considering taking legal action against the European Council for deciding not to
impose sanctions. See Enda O'Doherty, View from the European Press, Irish Times,
Jan. 19, 2004, at 8, availableat 2004 WL 61029250; Chris Flood, Preview: UK Interest
Rate Rise May Be Delayed, Fin. Times (FT.Com), Jan. 18, 2004, available at 2004 WL
56787003 (noting that the agenda for the EU finance ministers' meeting on January
18, 2003 included the Commission's threat to bring action against the Council). The
decision not to impose sanctions effectively seriously undermined the Stability and
Growth Pact. See Wolfgang Munchau, Flexible Rules for Europe Strictly Enforced,
Fin. Times, Jan. 19, 2004, at 13. The debate over this will undoubtedly reverberate
through EU politics. See George Parker & Bertrand Benoit, Brussels Insists on
Mounting Stability Pact Legal Challenge, Fin. Times, Jan. 14, 2004, at 2 ("The
spectacle of the Commission and the EU member states fighting in court over a
central plank of economic policy is a symptom of growing mistrust and ill feeling at
the heart of Europe."). There is some concern that golden share rulings demonstrate
only that the EU interferes in areas of national interest, where the EU does not
belong, and fear that "[t]he EU shifts power from democratic governments to elites
controlled by big corporations, seeking to create monopolies." Bob Glanville,
Activists Condemn EU Airport Ruling: Decision Prepares Ground For Hostile
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likely to stand idly by and permit individual states to disregard the
decision of the Court.523

Should Portugal and Spain continue to

ignore the decisions, the Commission can take further action and has
already indicated that it plans to initiate a proceeding against Portugal
for its failure to comply.5 24 Pursuant to Article 228, the Commission
may return to the Court and request that a penalty (lump sum or fine)
be imposed upon the delinquent Member State.525

Of course, the

suggestions of the Commission cannot bind the Court, 26 but the Court
has already demonstrated sympathy with the Commission's arguments
regarding the restriction of capital movements imposed by golden
shares. 27

2. Applicant and Acceding States

Privatization is not an historical artifact.528 It is still ongoing in
much of Central and Eastern Europe, and in other parts of the world,
such as Africa.529 Since many of the Central and Eastern European
Takeover, Morning Star, May 14, 2003, at 5, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Morning Star File (stating that the BAA ruling is "just another example of the
European Union meddling in politics and economics in Britain" (quoting Ian
Davidson, MP, chairman of Labour Against the Euro)). Such sentiments may have
no influence at all, as shown by the immediate compliance with the ECJ's ruling by
the U.K., even though voices of dissent have been heard. However, such sentiments
may strengthen the resolve of governments still battling to maintain their influence
over certain companies. And, since at least two nations have yet to comply, it is
apparent that there remains some dissatisfaction with the decisions at higher levels of
government. The fear that the EU is overshadowing national identity may fuel
support for the use of golden shares. On the other hand, some see their use as
"economic nationalism," which is contrary to the spirit of the EU, and not necessarily
the best business decision for some of these companies. See O'Grady, supra note 520.
522. Portugal has yet to comply with the decision. See May Press Release, supra
note 520. Spain also seems intent on ignoring the Court's ruling. See Follow My
Leader,The Bus., Jan. 18, 2004, availableat 2004 WL 60734799.
T[he] ... government has been stung into action by France and Germany's
methods of dealing with troublesome European Union rules by ignoring
them. After Paris and Berlin reacted to breaches of the stability and growth
pact by suspending the rules that would have imposed fines on them, Madrid
has decided to ignore the rules as they relate to golden shares.
Id.
523. See May Press Release, supra note 520 (publicizing the Commission's decision
to instigate action against Portugal for failure to comply).
524. See id.
525. EC Treaty art. 228(2).
526. Id.; see also Case C-387/97, Commission v. Greece, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5047,
89
("It should be stressed that these suggestions of the Commission cannot bind the
Court[,J ... [hiowever, the suggestions are a useful point of reference.").
527. With only one exception, the Court has been persuaded by the Commission's
arguments in the golden share cases. Only in the case of Belgium did the Court find
for the Member State rather than the Commission. See Case C-503/99, Commission v.
Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50 (2002).
528. Privatization is still ongoing in much of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as
in other parts of the world. See infra notes 529-30 and accompanying text.
529. For example, Ghana holds a golden share in Ashanti, a gold company. The
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nations are hoping to join the EU-some as early as May 2004-these
rulings have significant consequences for these nations and have not
gone unnoticed.530 Many are heeding the warning.
For example, Hungary is among the ten nations joining the EU in
2004.531 Hungary owns a golden share in MOL, an oil and gas
company. 32 The privatization agency, APV, has indicated that the
government's shares will be sold off over the next few years,533 but it
would like to hold on to its golden share as long as possible. 34
Hungary could still create a golden share in MOL, emulating the
scheme implemented by Belgium, which could withstand the Court's
scrutiny. Since the protection of the specific industries involved has

already been deemed an acceptable objective,535 the government need
only ensure that whatever law it fashions comports with the strict
requirements outlined in Belgium.536
Romania, which is not acceding to the Union in 2004, but has
applicant state status,537 has initiated proceedings to privatize SNP

golden share allows the Ghanian government to veto any company decision which
would alter the gold operation. See, e.g., Julie Bain, AngloGold Seeks Ashanti Shield,
Bus. Day (South Africa), Oct. 31, 2003, at 16, available at 2003 WL 66919947.
530. Both the Czech Republic and Poland are busy privatizing steel holdings in
order to comply with EU mandates on the limitation of state aid and new production
quotas, so it is obvious that the acceding states are paying close attention to the
mandates of EU law. See Polish and Czech Heavy Industries Undergo Painful
Transition,
EU
Bus.,
Oct.
26,
2003,
at
http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/031026025158.f65gm6ej.
There is no indication that
either state is attempting to maintain golden shares in these companies, which is just
as well, since it is highly unlikely that such restrictions could pass the justification
prong of the test.
531. See, e.g., http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/european-countries/neweu-members/
hungary/index-en.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
532. See Eral Yilmaz, Hungary-Tender for Advisor to MOL Privatisation
Attracts Five Bidders, WMRC Daily, Aug. 14, 2003, availableat 2003 WL 60322832.
533. See id.
534. See id. Despite the Court's determination that protectionist measures in the
energy and petroleum sectors can indeed be accepted under the right circumstances,
some still have the impression that such measures might not be permitted. See
Andrew Neff, Hungary Picks Citigroup to Steer State Sale of MOL Stake, WMRC
Daily, Sept. 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60324264 ("[R]ecent rulings by the
European Court of Justice indicate that EU member state governments will not be
allowed to keep golden shares in 'strategic' formerly state-owned companies that have
largely passed into private hands.").
535. See Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781,
47, [20021 2
C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), 47 (citing to Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus.
& Energy, 1984 E.C.R. 2727,
34-35, [19841 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984), % 34-35, which
held that protection of petroleum supplies may permit restrictions on Treaty rights);
Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, 46, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
50 (2002),
46 (permitting an indirect restriction on Article 56 and Article 43 rights
for protection of the nations' energy supplies).
536. Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50.
537. See
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/europeanscountries/candidate-countries/
romania/index-en.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
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Petrom, which also operates in the oil and gas sectors,538 and has
indicated that the state would like to reserve a golden share in the
privatized company.53 9 Given the framing of the Court's decisions in

the golden share cases, Romania would also likely be able to craft a
golden share which would be acceptable to the ECJ. Because the

industries in question, oil and gas, meet the threshold requirement of
an acceptable objective, 540 Romania need only ensure that the law is

crafted in such a way as to be minimally restrictive
and that it meet
5 41
the principles of legal certainty and proportionality.

Another applicant state which is proceeding with privatization is

Bulgaria.542 Bulgaria is privatizing the telecom company BTC. 43
Bulgaria has reached an agreement with the British based, Americanowned, Advent for the sale of the company, but Bulgaria will retain a

golden share in the company. 54 As with Hungary and Romania, the
company operates in an industry which might justify some state
control,5 4 and therefore, so long as Bulgaria formulates the golden
share in a narrowly tailored, proportionate and precise way, it need

not conflict with EU law.
It is likely that nations undergoing privatization are now in a better
position to reserve golden shares and implement schemes to protect
industries of vital public interest or public security interest which will
hold up to the ECJ's scrutiny. Using the Court's decisions and tests as

guidance, nations can evaluate which industries might meet the
threshold acceptable objective test-such as MOL in Hungary and
538. See Valerie Mason, Romania Launches Petrom Privatizations,WMRC Daily,
Aug. 27, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60323703; see also Andrew Neff, Buyers Ready,
Seller Not: Romanian Government Postpones Sale of Petrom Again, WMRC Daily,
July 16, 2003, available at 2003 WL 58437985.
539. See Neff, supra note 538.
540. See Case C-483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781,
47, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49,
47 (citing to Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984
E.C.R. 2727,
35, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984),
35, wherein the Court found
protection of petroleum supplies to be of fundamental importance to the national
security); cf. Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, 46, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50,
46 (holding that safeguarding of energy supplies can meet the criteria for restricting
capital flows).
541. See generally Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 39, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995),
39
(detailing the four required conditions for a restrictive law to be acceptable).
542. See
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/european_countries/candidate_countries/
bulgaria/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
543. See Boris Maleshkov, Chronology-No Quick End Seen to Stalled Bulgarian
Telecom PrivatisationSaga, Bulgarian News Dig., Oct. 2, 2003, available at 2003 WL
61953039.
544. See id.; see also ELANA, Bulgarian Telecommunications Company Report 8
(Sept. 27, 2002) (detailing
the golden share retained in BTC), at
http://www.elana.net/market/researches/BTC 26.09.2002-ENG.pdf.
545. See Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, $ 71, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), $ 71 (stating that the objective of ensuring the provision of
telecommunications service may "constitute a public security reason").
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Petrom in Romania.54 6 Using the Belgian system as a framework,5 47
some governmental control and influence can be maintained provided
that adequate safeguards are established to protect the affected
investors.548 There will likewise be some industries that cannot be

protected.

The Spanish ruling illustrates some such industries:

tobacco and commercial banking.549 It is also likely that, should the
German case get to the ECJ, car manufacturing will also be
excluded. 5 0 Nonetheless, there is a future for the use of a golden

share in the EU.
C. Effect of the Rulings
The Court's rulings in the golden share cases removed a large
obstacle to the ratification of a unified EU takeover law directive.

Creating a common law regarding cross-border takeovers has been a
goal of the EU since the Commission first expressed its intent to
prepare a directive on takeovers in 1985."1' The penultimate attempt
to adopt a takeover directive failed,552 in part because of vehement
German opposition which was motivated by fear that its large
companies, such as Volkswagen, would become a target for takeover
activity. 3 Unexpectedly, the Council finally succeeded in adopting a
takeover directive on December 16, 2003. 514 Though the adopted
version falls short of the ideal directive envisioned by internal market

commissioner Fritz Blokestein,

it is at least a step forward after

fourteen years of disagreement.

Though these six rulings will not

546. See supra notes 352-54 and accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 378-88 and accompanying text.
548. See supra Part II.B.3.
549. See supra notes 429-33 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 499-510 and accompanying text.
551. See, e.g., Completing the Internal Market, supra note 154, at 29. For a
summary of the developments and setbacks of the directive, see Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids, 2003 O.J.
(C 45E) 1. The Commission presented the initial proposal on January 19, 1989. The
latest attempt to pass the directive failed on July 4, 2001. See Eur. Parl. Doc. 2002 O.J.
(C 65E) 57, 113 (Minutes, 4 July 2001). See also High Level Group Report
(November), supra note 264; High Level Group Report (January), supra note 264;
Ruling Paves the Way for Pan-EuropeanInvestment, supra note 511.
552. See Eur. Par. Doc. 2002 O.J. (C 65E) 57 (Minutes, 4 July 2001). For a
discussion of the actions taken by the Commission in reaction to the rejection of the
directive, see Charles M. Nathan & Michael R. Fischer, An Overview of Takeover
Regimes in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, PLI Corp. L. & Prac. 1163,
1200-01 (2002).
553. See Equalising Shares; Governments Must Let Go of Privatised Companies,
Fin. Times, May 14, 2003, at 22.
554. See Daniel Dombey, ParliamentBacks Deal on European Takeover Directive,
Fin. Times, Dec. 17, 2003, at 3.
555. See id.; MEPs Approve Embattled Takeover Law, Euro. Voice, Dec. 18, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 61201927; Daniel Schwammenthal, EU ParliamentApproves
Watered-Down Takeover Code, Dow Jones Int'l News, Dec. 16, 2003, available at
WESTLAW, File No. 322-285-0131.
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bridge all of the differences between the Member States and their
approach to takeover law, they do alter the landscape of European
takeover law. The underlying reasoning behind disallowing most uses
of golden shares556 may well be applied to other protectionist or
defensive measures in the future, including the Volkswagen law.557
Because it is clear that the Court draws from previous case law when
facing new challenges, it is safe to say that the golden share rulings
will have a role in future EU legal developments.
The Court, perhaps more than any other body, has promoted the
realization of the Treaty's goal of a single European integrated
market.
Ultimately, this goal cannot be realized absent free
movement of capital. In limiting the use of golden shares, the Court
has taken an important step.
It is clear that the rulings limit the ability of Member States to use
the powerful golden share tool as an effective defense to takeovers.
For example, Portugal Decree law No. 380/93, which was declared
558 was
incompatible with the Treaty in Commission v. Portugal,
activated and used in 1998 to prevent a shareholder from acquiring
more than ten percent of Portucel.55 9 In 2000, the same law blocked a
hostile takeover attempt of Cimpor. 60 It is unlikely that these
companies would have been able to fend off takeover attempts in the
absence of the golden share. The golden share rulings level the
playing field to some extent, while still allowing Member States to
protect essential national interests.
CONCLUSION
While the Treaty gives expression to the underlying spirit and
purpose of the Community, it is the Court that breathes life into its
express and implied rights and obligations. The ability of the Court to
apply important principles to all of the freedoms has allowed
Community law to develop quickly and more comprehensively than it
otherwise might.
Drawing upon previous case law, the Court has formulated a
framework for analyzing golden shares. Because of the fact-intensive
nature of the inquiry into whether a specific golden share system is
acceptable, this framework will certainly continue to be invaluable
both to the nations hoping to maintain their golden shares, and to the
Commission in evaluating which systems infringe upon the free
movement of capital.

556. See supra Part II.
557. See supra notes 500-02 and accompanying text.
558. Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
48 (2002).
559. See Cdmara, supra note 12, at 511.
560. See id.
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The rulings are very important for several reasons. First, on a
practical level, they provide a framework for future analysis of golden
shares. 6' Second, from a broader perspective, the decisions embraced
some of the key principles, such as proportionality and legal
certainty,562 established regarding other fundamental freedoms,
importing elements which can now safely be called fundamental
principles, into the law of capital movements. Third, the judgments
are a big step toward accomplishing an integrated market. Finally, on
a practical level, the judgments provide guidance for future golden
shares-they may still be used to protect vital public interests, thus the
Court did not eviscerate Member States' ability to protect truly
important national interests.
The decisions are not completely satisfying, however. The Court's
refusal to face the Article 43 issue squarely5 63 is frustrating,
particularly in light of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's persuasive
argument in favor of an establishment analysis. The Court has also
failed to define adequately what is required to meet the legal certainty
requirement. Thus, future golden share cases will play a role in
clarifying these issues.

561. Many such systems still exist, and the Commission, perhaps emboldened by
these decisions, has instigated action against other Member States. Undoubtedly, any
of these infractions which end up before the ECJ will be subjected to the same
scrutiny as the previous six were.
562. See supra notes 191, 216 and accompanying text.
563. See supra note 428 and accompanying text.
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